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ABSTRACT
It Is often difficult to describe the dynamics of system be­
havior, for example, collective bargaining type behavior. One reason for 
the difficulty in modelling such situations has been the lack of modelling 
techniques that can handle abrupt changes in the behavior of the system* 
However, Rene Them's catastrophe theory has provided some new insights 
Into phenomena Involving sudden transitions*
The cusp catastrophe model presented in this study takes into 
account the possibility of multi-valuedness of the response variable*
The model provides a rational explanation of phenomena having the follow­
ing characteristicst Bimodality, sudden transitions, hysteresis, Inac­
cessibility, and divergence* This paper attempts to empirically verify 
the usefulness of the cusp model in describing the dynamics of system 
behavior in simulated bargaining situations*
The cusp model is illustrated by a data set generated by 
simulating a collective bargaining prooess* The simulation consisted of 
3$ teams (of four subjects each).participating in a collective bargaining 
game* The data set consisting of 2£8 samples of hour-long rounds of 
formal negotiations provided data on the demand intensities of the bar­
gaining subjects, idie expected and observed system behavior* Statistical 
analysis indicated that the cusp model is a good fit for observed system 
behavior in simulated bargaining situations*
While the results indicated possible usefulness of the cusp 
model, a more definitive study using larger sample sizes and alternative
vii
designs might establish the descriptive effectiveness of the model more 
conclusively. Hopefully, this preliminary study is the first step in 
the attempt at empirical verifications of the value of some of the catas­
trophe models in social sciences and business research.
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW
Increased understanding of the nature of human conflict and 
Its resolution has been one of the primary objectives of soolal scien­
tists* The work of von Neumann and Morgenstern, The Theory of Qaaes 
and Economic Behavior (19U7) provided a mew direction In this area by
reinforcing the economic theory of conflicts with, mathematics and
1
general methodology*
The theory of games deals with decisions; it Is a normative 
theory indicating how rational players can be expected to make decisions.
There are canstant-sum games, cooperative and non-cooperative non-
2
constant-sum games* However, the theory is not a descriptive theory 
In that it does not describe how people actually make decisions.^ In 
actual situations, often interests of people are partly coincident and 
partly opposed, indicating a tendency to cooperate to further common 
interests and a tendency to compete to enhance their own Individual 
Interests* Thus, the basic problem stems from the fact that while the 
parties at conflict are independent in their roles as decision makers,
<1
J* von Neumann and O* Morgens tern, The Theory of Panes and 
Economic Behavior (Princeton! Princeton University press, 19h7)*
2
J.C* Harsaayi, "Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solu­
tions in Cooperative and Non-cooperative Qames," Management Science,
9> (1962), pp. 11*1-153.
*A. Rapoport, M.J. Quyer and D.Q. Oordon, The 2 x 2 Qeaa.
I Ann Arbor t The University of Michigan Press, 1976), p* 3*
their welfare la mutually dependent.^ Businessmen, administrators, and 
military strategists are frequently involved in such decision making 
behavior, Situations of this nature Include union-management collective 
bargaining, peace negotiations in International relations, etc*, and may 
be termed aa collective bargaining type situations*
Since real life situations are rather complex, it is often 
desirable to design situations where bargaining behavior can be observed 
in order to draw some Inferences on conflicts in general* Such gaming 
experiments nay be termed as simulated bargaining situations* However, 
since simulations involving human behavior are not easily reproducible, 
the inferences one might draw from them may be of limited relevance in 
the construction of theories of conflict resolution*'* On the other 
hand, these simulations must be undertaken as a first step in system­
atically desorlbing certain aspects of the dynamics of conflict*
This study Is concerned with simulated bargaining situations 
of the nature of union-management collective bargaining* Uhion- 
aaaagewent collective bargaining is perhaps one of the more typical of 
collective bargaining type situations* In this context, collective 
bargaining is the Institutional process for solving problems involving 
employer-employee relationship* A significant part of this process 
is the negotiation between the company and union representatives in an 
effort to reach agreement on the terms aad conditions of employment*
L^.E, FOuraker and S* Siegel, Bargaining Behavior. (New Yorks 
MoQraw-Hill Bock Coopany, Inc., 1965), pp* 9u-9o*
'’A* Rapoport, et al., p. 11*
The bargaining behavior of such a system nay be assumed to range from
strike to lookout, including the nore eoanon position of mutual agree*
£.
ment, Stagner and Rosen postulate that both bargaining parties hare 
certain expectations and tolerance limits which define a bargaining sons 
(see figure 1). Is the parties bargain, they explore these limits In an 
effort to find an area in which a compromise is possible. If these 
limits are exceeded, a strike or a lockout may result. This model appears 
to be a good description of the collective bargaining process in general, 
but is essentially a static nodel.
Until recently, relatively fewer attempts appear to have been 
made in understanding the dynamics of formal negotiations. According to 
Hicks and Gullet^ little analysis of interorganlzatlonal behavior has 
been done, aad they believe that progress is sorely needed in this area, 
Che reason for the difficulty in modeling such situations has been the 
lack of techniques that can handle abrupt changes in the behavior of the 
system such as strikes and lockouts. However, a relatively new area of 
mathematics research called catastrophe theory has opened up some inter­
esting possibilities. This theory has been used to model cause and
D
effect processes. The originator of this theory, Thom , has provided a 
breakthrough in the modeling of complex dynamic behavior, in which con-
R^. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of lfaion-Hanagement Rela­
tions. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Htbllstusg Company, 19c£), pp. &*6.
7
H.O, Rioks and C.R. Gullet, The Management of Organisations 
(3d ed.(Hew lark: MoQraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1976), p. 168,
g
R. Them, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, (New York: 
W.A. Benjamin, Lao.,
FIGURE I
SIAONER-ROSEN MODEL FOR BARGAINING BEHAVIOR 
(Adapted from Stagner and Rosen, 1965)
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tinuous changes can cause discontinuous effects* Hie pioneering book, 
Structural Stability end Morphogenesis <1975)# provides the conceptual 
framework for catastrophe theory. This theory has been applied during 
the past five years in many disciplines, including physios, biology, social 
sciences, economics, and psychology. Catastrophe theory has provided new 
insights Into phenomena involving sudden transitions. Based on differen­
tial topology, the nathematioal proofs of the theorems are rather dif­
ficult to comprehend; however, the theory easily lends itself to many in­
terpretations and applications.
Based on the Stagner-Bosen description of collective bargain-
9ing behavior, Oliva and Capdevielle have conceptualised an application 
of one of the catastrophe models, the cusp model10 to collective bar­
gaining situations to help explain the dynamics of the system behavior*
In a broad sense, their model attempts to examine the system behavior in 
terms of two variables: management demand intensity and union demand 
Intensity, The purpose of this study is to examine the descriptive ef­
fectiveness of the cusp model by evaluating its validity in simulated 
bargaining situations. Of the several applications of catastrophe theory, 
relatively fewer models appear to have been tested even in laboratory 
experiments. According to Sutherland11, empirical validation of models
9
T.A. Oliva and C,H, Capdevielle, "Collective Bargaining as a 
Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of Academy of Management (1977a),
10A detailed description of the cusp model is presented in 
Chapter U,
Sutherland, Systems: Analysis. Administration, and 
Architecture. (New York: Von Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1975),
is a critical feature of system approach* Therefore, to be consistent 
with the system approach, validation exeroises oast be undertaken to
the descriptive effectiveness of the models* However, such exes* 
else a need only be aimed at application situations, since validity of an 
application would automatically reflect on the validity of the concep­
tual model* In this sense laboratory testing of collective bargaining 
behavior appears to be a promising way to explore the validity of the 
cusp model. To accomplish this purpose several working hypotheses were 
proposed.^-2
This study has focused on two variables, management demand 
intensity and union demand intensity; the experimental procedure adopted 
in this study eliminates other variables which may well be important in 
bargaining. The data collection has focused on the relative perception 
of the variables (not their absolute amounts)*^ The scope of this re­
search is thus confined to simulated bargaining situations involving 
these two variables*
PLAN OF DEVELOPMENT 
In Chapter H  a review of background information relevant to 
this study is presented* After discussing some basic concepts of bar­
gaining behavior, the chapter evaluates the merits of the descriptive aid 
normative approaches in this area, with particular reference to collec­
12
The working hypotheses are presented in Chapter III*
13A. Soodel, J.S* Minas,P. Ratoosh and M. LLpeta, "Sane Des­
criptive Aspeots of Two-Person Non-Zero Sun Games," Journal of Conflict 
flesolutlon* 3, (19i>9), pp* Uli-119* According to the authors, relative 
stanciing seems more important than absolute benefits in conflicts*
tive bargaining situations • Next, catastrophe models are presented in 
general without their mathematical derivations, followed by a more de­
tailed description of the cusp model. The application of the cusp model 
to collective bargaining situations is explained in terms of isomorphic 
relationship between the two. Illustrations are provided to help explain 
the bargaining behavior of the system in terms of management and union 
demand intensities.
Chapter III discusses the research methodology and the proce­
dures for collection of data. The chapter begins by some of the key 
definitions, and explains the subjects,procedures and instruments for 
data collection. The instruments used for data collection are a psycho­
logical insight test questionnaire aad a collective bargaining game. The 
chapter also contains statements of working and formal hypotheses, and 
procedures for the analysis of data. The chi-square test for goodness 
of fit was adopted for testing the hypotheses. The collective bargaining 
game consists of negotiation of a hypothetical agreement between prese­
lected pairs of subjects. The selection of subjects is based on their 
responses to the psychological insight test questionnaire. The demand 
intensities of the participants are measured in successive rounds of ne­
gotiations and the actual behavior of the system is recorded. The ex­
pected behavior of the system is estimated from the cusp model, and tested 
for statistical significance. The chapter finally discusses the experi­
mental procedure in general.
The results of the research and the findings are presented in 
Chapter 17. Chapter 7 contains a discussion of results and the conclu­
sions of this inquiry. Finally sane suggestions for further research
are proposed. 
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this ohapber is to present a review of the 
literature relevant to this study* The first part is an introduction of 
various oo ncepts relating to bargaining behavior in general and collec­
tive bargaining behavior in particular, and a broad discussion of a ana 
of the existing models* The second part takes a look at a new genera­
tion of models called catastrophe models* Some of the basic ooncepts 
underlying catastrophe theory are introduced and the Implications of 
these models are briefly outlined* The cusp catastrophe model is 
examined in detail since it is the specific structure chosen for this 
research. The third part examines a model of collective bargaining be­
havior by establishing an isomorphism between collective bargaining phe­
nomenon and the cusp model*
CONFLICTS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
In a broad sense, conflict presupposes clashes of values and
Interests between groups of individuals*1 According to Walton and
2
McKersle, the intergroup conflicts may arise when there is an Interaction
■Hf*J. Soott aad T.R, Mitchell. Organisation Theory: A Struc­
tural and Behavioral Analysis (Homewood, Illinois: HLohard d* Irwin, Ibo,, 
1972), p. 189* For a typology of conflicts and causes, see T.V. Bonama, 
"Conflict,Cooperation and Trust in Three Power Systems," Behavioral 
Solenoe* 21 (Nov. 1976),pp. U99-£Ll.
2
R.E* Nhlton and R.B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor 
Negotiations (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1963), p. 3*
10
of two or more complex social units whloh are attempting to define or re­
define the terns of their Interdependence* In an abstract sense, conflict
arises when two or more entitles try to occupy the sane state-space, but
•7
only one can do so.
Conflict resolution involves a search for an outcome which r^ 
presents for sane participants an improvement from, and to no partici­
pants a worsening of, their present situation.^ However, in sons 
instances, the resolution nay result in gains for some participants at 
the expense of others. In general, there is a diversity of opinion abort 
the origins, functions, and resolution of conflict among behavioral 
scientists*
March and Simon indicate four common outcomes of intergroup
£
conflicts:
1) Problem-solving behavior,
2) persuation,
3) bargaining, and
1|) political behavior*
In problem solving,the conflicting units seek the most effec­
tive means for reaching agreed upon goals* In persuation, each unit
D,R, Hampton, C.E* Summer and R.A. Webber, Organisational 
Behavior and the Practice of Management (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, 
fcbresman and Company, 1973 ), p* £>71.
kj.M. Alexander and T.L. Saaty, "The Forward and Backward 
Process of Conflict Analysis," Behavioral Science. 22 (Mar, 1977), p* 87*
Kerch aad H* Simon, Organisations (Dew York: John Wiley 
aad Sons, 1928), pp* 121-129* For a somewhat similar analysis of qopfliot 
resolution see S. LaTour, P*Houlden, L, Welker and J« Thibaut, "Sobs 
Determinants of Preference Modes of Conflict Resolution, ” Journal of Con­
flict Resolution. 20 (June 1976), pp* 319-326* The authors discuss con­
flict resolubioa procedures arranged along a continuum of decreasing 
third-party intervention*
11
trlea to persuade the other unit to accept lte goals aa legitimate. Once 
goals are agreed upon, it la relatively easy to find the moat effective 
means for reaching them. In bargaining, goal conflict is explicit and 
recognised, but there is some agreement on the procedures that may le­
gitimately be eqpleysd for resolving the conflict. In politics, there is 
total disagreement not only on goals but on the means by which the con­
flict may be resolved,** The assumption in the first three outcomes is 
that although there is conflict, agreement is possible; and that the 
factors that significantly affect these conflicts are interdependence, 
goal and perceptual differences. In a majority of intergroup conflicts, 
the process of bargaining is believed to have broad appeal,
BARGAINING
7
Bargaining implies bilateral negotiation. It is defined as 
a process wheret
1) there are two or more parties with diverging interests,
2) the parties can communicate,
3) mutual compromise is possible,
Uj provisional offers can be made, and 
*>) the provisional offers do not fix the tangible outoomes 
until aa offer is accepted by all sides. ®
Thus bargaining is said to occur when parties at conflict confer and
exchange ideas about a possible settlement until either a compromise is 
reached or the bargaining is terminated.^
L^oc. cit,
7
3. LaTour, et al., op,cit., p, 320.
o
J*M. Ghertkoff and J,K. Baser, "A Review of Experiments in 
Explicit Bargaining." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 12 
<£fept. 1976), p. W K  -----------  --------------- -----
I^bid.
12
The social patterns of stress, conflict, and bargaining are 
inevitable in a dianglmg miTli niawnit,10 Ohertkoff and Baser11 suggest 
that bargaining Is a pervasive and important phenomenon; it occurs bet­
ween individuals, greqps, organisations aad countries. Examples include 
uaLom-managemsnt disputes, international disputes, territorial disputes, 
price disputes, and even domestic disputes. Bargaining behavior of the 
system is the end result of decision making behavior12 of the partici­
pants. Compromise aad lapaase In formal negotiations are examples of 
the bargaining behavior of the system.11
The current approaches to the study of phenomena involving 
bargaining behavior fall into two distinct classes: descriptive and 
normative. The descriptive approach attempts to describe how real people 
make decisions in situations involving conflicts of interests j while the 
normative approach attempts to discover how certain idealised actors, 
called rational players, can be expected to males decisions in such situa­
tions.1^
10C. Barnard, The functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Tfeiversitjr Press, 1950}, p. 36.
11J.H, Ohertkoff aad J.K, Baser, op, cit*, p. Ii6t»,
12Some authors refer to this as choice behavior: S, Siegel,
A,E, Siegel and J.M. Andrews, Choice. Strategy and Utility (Hew Tork: 
HoOrav-HLU Book Coaqpaqy, 196U).
13L.C. Hegginson, Personnel and Kama Resources Administration 
(Homewood, Illinois* Richard D, Irwin, Inc., 19?Y), pp. 5^3-^5.
^A, Bapoport, M,J* Ouyer and D,Q, Oorden, The 2 x 2 Qame 
(Aim Arbor: The IMversity of Michigan Press, 1976), p. 33,
13
DESCRIPTIVE MODELS 
Traditionally, bargaining behavior was assumed to be a funo- 
tion of relative bargaining power of the parties at conflict. Pigou 
described bargaining in terns of upper and lower Units of the demands 
of the participants leading to two types of bargaining behavior: a com­
promise in a range of practical bargaining, and an impasse with no area 
for pr&ctioal bargaining.
Tertnme^ has developed a modified Lewlnian model for two- 
person interaction behavior:
where B.. « Interaction behavior of the system comprising lndivi- 
duals i and J,
PjP. . The system qualities defined as the configuration of 
3 personalities within the system, as may be Indicated, 
for example by a multiplicative sum of relevant per­
sonality dimensions, and
S. « Contributions of the situation within which the actors 
are behaving.
Terhune refers to interaction behavior of the system in terms of coopera-
17tion, exploitation, and conflict.
1*5A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare Uth ed. (London: Mac­
millan & Co., Ltd., 1933)* pp. i&0-ii61. For a comparative discussion of 
Pigou's model see L.C. Megginson, op. cit., pp. J>2‘J-J>26. A more detailed 
discussion of bargaining theories from the behavioral point of view is 
provided in H.E. Walton and R.B. McKersie, op. cit. See also by the same 
authors, "The Theory of Bargaining," Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
(April 1966), pp. blb-li2lu
^K.W, Terhune, "Waah-in, Wash-out and Systemic Effects in Ex­
tended Prisoner*s Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 18 (Dec 191k),
pp. 680—683.
17Ih this model, interaction behavior of the system has the same 
implication as bargaining behavior of the system. Although the model was 
developed to explain interaction behavior in Prisoner's Dilemma situations, 
it applies in general to the process of bargaining.
lit
In a general sense, the descriptive models attempt to relate 
the bargaining behavior of the system with the behavioral/situational 
variables* However, contributors In this area appear to differ as to 
the relative inqportanee of some of the specific determinants of bargain­
ing behavior*
NORMATIVE MODELS 
The origin of normative models may be traced to the work of 
von Neumann and Morgenstem, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.^
Game theory can be formally defined as a theory of rational decision in
20eonfliot situations* Models of such situations Involve:
1) a set of decision makers, called players,
2) a set of strategies available to each player,
3) a set of outcomes, each of which is a result of particular
choices of strategies made by the players on a given 
play of the game, and
1*) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each of the
possible out cones*
There are two olasses of models in game theory: the constant-
sum (special case: zero-sum) models and the nonconstant-sum models* In
constant-sum games, the interests of players are diametrically opposed,
and in nonconstant-sum games, these Interests may partially coincide*
Models are also sometimes classified with reference to the number of
a recent review of a number of alternative approaches 
see M* Patohen, "Models of Cooperation and Conflict: A Critical Review," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution. 1U (Sept 1970), pp. 389-1*07: J.M. Chert- 
koff and «y*K. Baser, pp* cit*
19J. von Neumann and 0* Morgenstem, The Theory of Games and 
Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University press, 191*7)•
20A. Rapoport (ed*), Game Theory aa a Theory of Conflict Resolu­
tion (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1971*), pp* 1-3*
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players, and according to the degree of freedom In choice of strategies; 
these strategies could be mixed (probabilistically chosen) or pure*
The constant-sum models are based on the assertion that there
exists, available to each player, at least one optimal strategy, which
21may be pure or mixed* A player choosing such an optimal strategy can 
guarantee himself a certain minimal payoff; this means that each player 
can keep the other's payoff down to the letter's guaranteed minimum*
The resulting outcome of the game is called equilibrium; it is Pareto- 
optimal if there is no other outcome in which both players get a larger 
payoff* It is then possible to prescribe an optimal strategy to each 
player; if both players follow this prescription, each will do as well 
as he possibly can in that game (against a rational player)* Von Neumann 
and Morgenstem also show that if there are several equilibria, deter­
mined by paired choice of optimal strategies, then they will all be
22
equivalent and interchangeable. Implication of these models is that 
if one player keeps to his optimal strategy, the other can not Improve 
his payoff by shifting away from his own optimal strategy, he may actual­
ly impair his payoff in the process.
Solutions of nonoonstant-sum games involving more than two 
players are less satisfactory in a normative sense* These games are 
further classified as non-cooperative and cooperative games depending on 
whether the choices of strategies must be made independently or coor­
dinated, These are games in which the interests of the players partially
21
J* von Neumann and 0* Morgenstern, loc, cit.
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coincide in that both M y  prefer one outcome to another. Although every 
non-cooperative game with a finite nunber of playere and etrategiee has 
at leaat one equilibrium, there could be several equilibria that are
not necessarily equivalent or Interchangeable. Further, these equili-
2kbria are frequently, Pareto-deficient. Harsanyl ^  tries to overctane some 
of these difficulties by allowing communication and bargaining In non- 
cooperative games. The possibility of oanmunication and bargaining is 
said to greatly facilitate the establishment of a unique solution. How­
ever, Harsanyl assumes that the players are not able to make enforceable 
agreements and excludes nonequilibrium strategy pairs from consideration 
as solutions.
The theory of cooperative games Introduces communication, 
bargaining and enforceable agreements into game-theoretic concepts as 
possible means of arriving at Pareto-optimal solutions. In a cooperative 
game, although the Interests of the players can be and generally are in 
(partial) conflict, it still makes sense for them to cooperate in order 
to ensure Pareto-optimality of the outcome. If the game has more than
one such outcome, it Is among them that the preferences of the players
26are in conflict. Such a game is also a nonconstant-sum game since there 
are outcomes that are preferred by both players to other outcomes.
21J.F. Nash, "Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games," Proceed­
ings of the National Academy of Sciences (PSA). 36 (19£o), pp. h$-li9.
Harsanyl, "Rationality Postulates for Bargaining Solu­
tions In Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Games," Management Science. 9 
(1962), pp. 1U1-1S3.
2*Ibid.
26A. Rapoport (1976), op. cit., p. £0.
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Rapoport's example of simple bargaining Involves a seller and a buyerj 
the seller is milling to sell an object at any price above a certain 
rtrHnim price. If the maximum price the buyer la willing to pay is less 
than the n&ninnnn price the seller is willing to accept, obviously no 
agreement is possible] however, if the buyer's maximum exceeds the 
seller'8 minimum, there exists a negotiation set (which may also be con­
sidered as a single -value d curve of possible rational solutionsJ. This 
situation is called elementary bargaining problem (Figure II), and its 
solution is assumed to be contingent upon symmetry, Pareto Optimality, 
independence from Irrelevant alternatives, and invariance under positive 
linear transformations.*^ Different methods of solving this problem are
OQ
available. These solutions have preserved lesser normative flavor in 
terms of prescribing rational decision-making behavior, as compared with 
the oanstant-ffum games. A special case of nonconstant-sum game called 
"Prisoner's Dilemma" has posed a fundamental question for proponents of 
normative models. The question "What is rational choice?" in this situa-
A, Rapoport, "Conflict Resolution in light of Dame Theory," 
in P. Swingle (ed.), The Structure of Conflict (New York: Academic Press, 
1970), pp. 1-1*2. Variations of the elementary bargaining problem are 
disoussed by several authors. They attempt to explore the effeots of 
certain factors relating to initial conditions,magnitude and frequency 
of concessions, and information about payoffs upon bargaining behavior. 
For more details, see Q.A. Yuld, "Effects of Opponent's Initial Offer," 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 30, (1971*), pp. 325-335}
J.ri. Ghertkoff and J.K. Esser, op. cit.| D. Bruckman and T.V. Bonoma, 
"Determinants of Bargaining Behavior in a Bilateral Monopoly Situation 
IX: Opponent's Concession Rate and Similarity," Behavioral Science. 21, 
(July 1976), pp. 252-262} D.S. Felsenthal, "Bargaining Behavior when 
Profits are Unequal and Losses are Equal," Behavioral Science. 22, (Sept 
1977), pp. 33U-3UO.
^J.F. Nash, "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrics. 18, (1950), 
pp. 155-162. For recent work on Nash's model, see R.V. Nydegger,
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FIGURE II
THE UTILITY PAYOFF SPACE OF THE ELEMENTARY BARGAINING PROBLEM
(Adapted from A. Rapoport, "Conflict Resolution In the Light 
of Game Theory," in P. Swingle (ed.), The structure of Con­
flict, New York, Academic Press, 1970, pp. lo-ll)
(0,0)
Legend: Curve : the negotiation set x : Utility gain of Player 1
Origin: the statue quo point y : Utility gain of Player 2
(x,y) : a possible outcome
Solution: Of all possible rectangles with one comer at the Origin
and another on the negotiation set, the rectangle that has 
Idle largest area defines the solution to the bargaining 
problem.
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tion centers around two concepts of rationality, namely individual ra-
20
tionality and collective rationality, 7
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
A special type of bargaining commonly known as collective 
bargaining occurs in union-management disputes, international disputes, 
territorial disputes, etc. Situations of this nature will be referred 
to as collective bargaining type situations. According to Davis, 
it is essentially a compromise and balancing of opposing pressures; and 
the objective of collective bargaining is to work toward a new equili­
brium of sooial forces and to make it easier to maintain this equili­
brium,
Hagginson^ defines collective bargaining as a sooial, as 
wall as a legal and economic process. In the context of Uhion-management 
conflict, collective bargaining is the Institutional process for solving 
problems involving terms and conditions of employment via formal nego­
tiations, Such negotiation normally culminates in the signing of a 
written instrument, termed labor agreement or union contract, which sets
"Independent Utility Scaling and the Nash Bargaining Model," Behavioral 
Science, 22, (July 1977), pp, 283-289; M, Stwaan and J,B. Crus, Jr., 
uNash Equilibrium Strategies for the Problem of Armament Control," 
Management Science. 22, (sept 197$), PP* 96-105,
29
A, Rapoport (197U), op, clt«, pp, 17-5U, Between 1952 and 
present, several hundreds of experimental studies have been reported on 
Prisoner's Dilemma, This game has brought to focus some of the limita­
tions of normative approaches to choice behavior,
30
K, Davis, Human Behavior at Work (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1972), p, 27a.
»WI. Megginson, Personnel: A behavioral Approach to Adminis­
tration (Homewood, Illinois: Rickard D, Irwin, Inc., 1972), p, 173,
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forth the terns and conditions of employment for a fixed period of tine. 
However, disruptive labor-management relationships may also develop 
during the negotiations, in the form of threatened or actual strikes and 
lookouts.
Kochan-Wheeler description of the collective bargaining pro­
cess postulates that the relationships between environmental character­
istics union and management organizational characteristics, and the
32bargaining process determine the bargaining outcomes.
Stagner and Rosen have proposed a more specific description
of collective bargaining behavior in terms of motivation, perception,
organization and leadership as the basic variables which manifest in the 
form of desires and expectations (see Figure 1 in Chapter I):
32For more details see T.A. Kochan and H.N. Wheeler, "Municipal 
Collective Bargaining: A Model and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes,1 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 29 (Oct. 1975). pp. 1:6-66. A 
similar description may be found in P.F. Gerhart, "Determinants of Bar­
gaining Outcomes in Local Government Labor Negotiations," Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 29 (Apr 1976), pp. 331-351.
^R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union-Management Rela­
tions (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, Inc., 19^ 5), pp. 90-96. Similar 
description of bargaining behavior as a function of behavioral variables 
may be found in S.H. Slichter, J.J. Healy and E.R. Iivemash, The 3apact 
of Collective Bargaining on Management (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, 1960;$ R.E. Walton and R.B, MoKersie, A Behavioral Theory 
of Labor Negotiation, op. cit.; M.S. Vfortman and C.W. Randle, Col3ective 
Bargaining Principles and Practice (Boston: Houghton Mlffin Co., 1966J) 
ff.M. Levinson. Determining Forces"in Collective Bargaining (New York:
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1966); L.C. Megginson and C.R.' Gullet, "A Pre­
dictive Model of Union-Manageraent Conflict," Personnel Journal (June 
1970)j J.B. Miner and M.G. Miner, Personnel and Industrial Relations:
A Managerial Approach (New York: MacMillan & do., ktd., 1973)'; .^H.' 
Cassel and J.J. Baron, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector (Colum­
bus: Grid Ins., 1975 )j S.W. deilerman. Manager sand Subordinates (Hina- 
dale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1976); and L.C, Megginson (19t7), op. 
cit.) T.A. Kochan and H.N. Wheeler, op, cit.) and P.F. Gerhart, op. cit. 
In a general sense, the Stagner-Rosen description seems to have broad 
appeal.
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Both parties bring eertaln expectations to the negotia­
tions* It is general practice for each group to write 
its own expectations into proposals for the new con­
tract*.«, Similarly, each side is likely to have, at 
the beginning of negotiations, an idea of the limit 
beyond which it will make no concessions, this limit 
results in a bargaining tone for each side, with the 
preferred solution on one end and the tolerance limit 
on the other***.* As the parties bargain, they ex­
plore these limits and, hopefully, find an area in 
which a compromise is possible. For both sides, there 
is a bargaining aone between the employer's tolerance 
limit and the union tolerance limit*.••« Bach side 
can always find some instances to support the "wished 
for" solution; and each side will tend to ignore the 
evidence presented by the opposition. Nevertheless, 
communication does take place; each takes cognisance 
of the data, and the acceptability shifts. Manage­
ment moves up a little, and the union moves down a 
little, until an acceptable point for both Is reached.
The Stagner-Rosen model also implicitly recognises the bargain­
ing behavior of the system when the tolerance limits of the participants 
is reached* The implication is that when the union tolerance limit is 
reached, rather than yielding further, the union may declare a strike;
and a lockout may result if the management perceives that its tolerance
35limit has been reached*
DISCUSSION OF CURRENT APPROACHES 
ttiere seem to be same new trends in building descriptive and 
predictive models of bargaining behavior. However, the proponents of 
descriptive models intuitively recognise that it is often difficult to
3l*Ibid.
35For a somewhat similar description of bargaining behavior see 
E.R. Brown, "The Effects of Need to Maintain Face on Interpersonal Bar­
gaining," Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, h (Mar. 1968), pp. 
107-122*
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describe the dynamics of bargaining behavior (even in a qualitative sense) 
especially in collective bargaining situations. For instance, company 
executives often confess that they had no idea the union would strike 
over an apparently minor demand,and union leaders sometimes err in esti­
mating management's intensity of feeling:
Both sides are human} managers have certain expectations 
about "management rights,” which may trigger such strong 
emotions that rational bargaining is impossible. Union­
ists, likewise, have emotions, which sometimes prevent 
them from seeing issues realistically, so that they 
strike even though it cannot possibly lead to any net 
economic gain.3°
Such is the complexity of collective bargaining type situations. Thus,
one must reluctantly conclude that the existing descriptive models are
essentially static and do not apperar to Capture the dynamic properties
of the system} they also seem to lack mathematical elegance and very few
attempts appear to have been made to quantify the behavioral variables
37involved in the models.
A major problem with the normative models is that these models 
attempt to predict how the participants ought to behave under assumptions 
about variables such as their rationality, information, preferences, and
«
risk-taking propensities, instead of incorporating propositions that ex­
plain or describe how the participants act or the actual outcomes of the
36R. Stagner and H. Rosen, op. cit.
37For specific criticisms and a more detailed discussion of 
some of the problems involved, see J.M. Chertkoff and J.K. Esser, op. 
cit., pp. U6u-U68. The authors suggest that the existing models suffer 
from one or more of the following problems: (1) There are measurement 
problems in quantifying the mediating factors, (2) the relations between 
possible variables and the mediating factors are no spelled out clearly, 
(3) the theories are stated so broadly and/or with so little precision
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process* That is, the normative models are concerned with the structure 
of games and disregard suoh important factors as individual personali­
ties of the players, their bargaining abilities, their relations to each 
other; the players are simply assumed to be "rational,Additionally, 
the much publicized Prisoner's Dilemma has exposed the ambivalence of 
optimal strategy in general. The result is that there has been a heavy 
emphasis on experimental games involving predispositional variables such 
as personality, power, threats, etc. However, contributors differ as to 
the relative importance of structural vs. behavioral variables as deter­
minants of bargaining behavior.
In sunnary, both descriptive and normative models have weak­
nesses; the descriptive models are static, and there are controversies 
about the extent of relevance of game-theoretic conclusions to collective 
bargaining type situations. Attempts to integrate game-theoretic formu­
lations with experimental procedures in behavioral theory appear to be 
promising, but do not seem to adequately explain sudden transitions in
bargaining behavior in general and collective bargaining behavior in
39particular. Therefore, the descriptive effectiveness of these models
that very few if any findings could ever lead to rejection or modification 
of the theories. These criticisms apply to the normative models as well 
in varying degrees.,o
A. Raqpoport and J. Peraer, "Nash's Solution of Cooperative 
Game," in A, Bapoport (ed.), op. cit., p. llU.
^Por recent work in this area see D. Druckman and T.7. Bonoma, 
op* cit. The authors observe that bargainers sometimes retaliate to the 
opponent's pressure by suddenly decreasing concessions, even rejecting 
the process completely. However, the explanation provided by the authors 
for suoh behavior appears to be rather limited in scope.
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appears to be somewhat limited* Oliva and Capdevlelle have suggested 
that some of these problems might be overcome by mapping the important 
characteristics of the Stagner-Rosen model onto the cusp catastrophe 
model.^ A review of catastrophe theory and an explanation of the cusp 
catastrophe model are provided in the following sections,
CATASTROPHE THEORY 
Catastrophe theory, a relatively new area of mathematics re­
search, has provided a breakthrough In the modeling of complex dynamic 
behavior. The developer of the theory, Thom, has provided the conceptual 
framework for catastrophe theory in his book, Structural stability and
I
Morphogenesis, According to Zeeman:
*. • * The method has potential for describing the evolu­
tion of forms in all aspects of nature, and hence it 
embodies a theory of great generality; it can be applied 
with particular effectiveness in those situations where 
gradually changing forces or motivations lead to abrupt 
changes in behavior. For this reason the method has 
been named catastrophe theory.
Phenomena involving sudden variations traditionally had been 
assumed to be outside the reach of mathematical treatment, because they 
lacked what was considered to be an essential precondition, the conti­
nuity of dependence relations between the variable s.^ The main thrust
k°T.A. Oliva and C.M, Capdevlelle, “Collective Bargaining as a 
Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of Academy of Management. (1977a),
^R, Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis (Reading, 
Massachusetts: W.A. Benjamin, inc., 1975).
^2E.C, Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory," scientific American 
(April 1976), p. 69.
^C.A. Xsnard and E.C. Zeeman, "Some Models from Catastrophe
FIGURE III 
Behavior of a Single-valued Function 
(Adapted from Thom, 1977;
2?
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FIGURE 17 
Behavior of a Moltl-valued Function 
(Adapted from Thom, 1977)
x
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of catastrophe theory is the explanation of how gradually changing forces 
can cause discontinuous (catastrophic) behavior. According to Thom,
"these phenomena are highly unstable, difficult to repeat, and hard to 
fit into a mathematical theory, because the characteristics of all form, 
all morphogenesis, is to display itself through discontinuities of the 
environment."^ These sudden transformations and unpredictable diver­
gences render the traditional mathematical models inadequate, since these 
models depend on the use of continuous (single-valued; functions. Thom^ 
suggests that the use of single-valued functions may be inappropriate for 
modeling sudden transitions and unexpected divergences, and thus the tra­
ditional models often fail to capture the true causal relationships. In 
support of this "finite hypothesis," Thom has provided several illustra­
tions.
Figure III shows a system defined by two single-valued para­
meters (a and b). Movement along the curve is possible only between the 
singularities. In the process of gradually changing the oontrol variable, 
exceeding singularity b, or not reaching singularity a, would cause the 
system to break down. However, if the system is defined by parameters 
that can take on more than one value (represented by a behavior surface 
with a fold in the middle), gradual changes in the control variable would 
cause sudden changes at the singular points (see Figure 17).
Theory in the Social Sciences," in C. Collins (ed.) The Use of Models in 
the Sooial Sciences (Boulder, Colorado: Vfestview Press,1976;, p. U5.
^R. Them, op. cit., p. 9.
^R. Thorn, "Catastrophe Theory and its Applications," Pasqualle 
Porcelll Memorial Lecture (Baton Rouge, Louisiana: Louisiana State Univer- 
sity, June 16, 1977).
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Thom calls these sudden changes as catastrophes, and has shown
that such changes occur as a result of local minimisation of potential
energy at the singularities*^ The behavior of the system is said to be
a function of possible families of potentials, and can be represented by
structurally stable topological surfaces.^7 Topology is a branch of
mathematics concerned with the properties of surfaces in many dimensions.
Thom calls the shape of the structurally stable (equilibrium) surfaces
as morphologies.The proceeding arguments can be expressed mathemati- 
li9cally as follows:
Notation: Consider a process p in which C (cause) causes B (effect)*
Topologically C and B are smooth surfaces (also known as manifolds) and 
the process is usually expressed as p : C x B C, that is, p takes 
a point C and processes it to generate a value on B, and this relation­
ship may be studied by* looking at C. This notation preserves the direc­
tion of causality in contrast with algebraic notation involving equa­
tions* The notation also implies that the process is smooth and real­
valued, that is, the chain of causality is smooth and real* Points c
on the surface C can be partitioned into "regular" points and "catastro-
\
phe" points* Regular points exhibit homeomorphism, that is, there exists 
a one-to-one map that is smooth and has a smooth inverse between B and Cj
k6Ibid.
**7Ibid.
**8Ibid.
The mathematical notation is adopted from R. Thom (197!?), op, 
cit., and B.C. Zeeman, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory," Tokyo Inter­
national Conference on Manifolds (1973)*
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points not possessing this characteristic are called catastrophe points* 
Thom suggests that use of single-valued functions would be inappropriate 
to explain the catastrophe points. His method overcomes this difficul­
ty by the use of multi-valued functions*
Suppose f : Rk x H*1 R be a smooth function representing 
a dynamic system where R^ (the control surface) represents the cause 
(with k ^  ?), R31 (the behavior surface) represents the effect, and
f represents a potential or an energy function. Then the system is said
to attempt to locally minimize f. In a sense, the system adopts a mini­
max strategy as defined in game theory.'’® Thom believes that all con-
flicts evolve so as to minimize the damage that results.
For any given control point c €  R^ , the local potential
function f s R*1-^ R given by f (x) - f (c,x) can be minimized locally o c
by differentiating f with respect to x. Thus for any differentialc
equation x - - grad f ■ 0 defines lo c a l minima, whereX*
x - (X?, .... xn ) £  tf1, and grad^ f - grad £q » (|£  .... ^ ) .
Then the stable equilibria are given by the minima of f . Since there
v
is obviously more than one singularity x of f , x will be a multi-
C O C
valued function Rn, Now consider the maxima of f . Suppose
v
when grad^ f * 0, where generically H^, is a k-manifold 
given by n equations, and X£ «* -► is the catastrophe map of f.
Thom*s Theorem: If f is generic (i.e., belongs to an 
open-dense set), then (l) is a k-manifoldj (2) Any singularity of
°^J. von Neumann and 0# Morgenstem, op. cit.; the authors 
provide a detailed discussion of minimax theorem.
^R. Thom (197?), op. cit., p. UU3.
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is equivalent^2 to one of a finite number of elementary catastrophes 
(for K^T U, the number of elementary catastrophes ■ 7){ and (3) X^ is
stable under small perturbations of f. (Proof of the theorem is not 
di.
discussed here*)
Catastrophe theory holds that discontinuities and divergences 
are mathematically natural and can be precisely handled. Thom argues 
that the behavior of a system can be represented by morphologies, and 
postulates that catastrophe theory is involved with morphogenesis (the
genesis of form) in the Universe.^
56
According to Zeeman, catastrophes occur when the equilibrium 
breaks down. Catastrophe theory attempts to describe the shapes of all 
possible morphologies. In particular, if the system is governed through 
potentials by at most a four-dimensional control, structurally stable 
catastrophes can occur in only seven ways as shown. These seven elemen­
tary catastrophes describe all possible discontinuities in phenomena 
controlled by no more than four factors, and are given by simple poly-
52Two graphs X, and X2 are equivalent in a qualitative sense 
if there is a diffeomorpnisra (a one-to-one map of the plane onto Itself 
that is smooth and has smooth inverse) of the plane that maps vertical 
lines to vertical lines and maps to X^ . For more details see loo. cit.
53
Stable means that Xf is equivalent to X for all g in a 
neighborhood of f. g
%V>r a comparatively less rigorous proof see T. Poston and I. 
Stewart, "Thorn's Classification Theorem: Intuitive Approach," in T.
Poston and I. Stewart, Taylor Expansions and Catastrophies (Belmont, 
California: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1976), pp. 22-76.
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^ R . Thom (197*0, op. cit., p. 320.
^^ E.C. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory," Scientific American 
(April 1976), p. 78.
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nominals (see Table I).^7
In the proceeding table, each of the seven catastrophes is 
associated with a potential function in which the control parameters are 
represented as coefficients (a, b, c, d; and the behavior of the system 
is determined by the variables (x, y). Hie behavior surface in each 
model is the graph of all the points where the first derivatives are 
equal to sero.
Catastrophe theory has been applied in several fields includ­
ing physics, biology, and social sciences* Some of the phenomena that 
have been explained using catastrophe models are: the catastrophe ma­
chine, aggression, committee behavior, national defense, economic growth, 
nerve impulse, phase transition, optical caustics, behavior of the stock 
market, buckling of elastic beams, population dynamics, and collective
ea
bargaining*
Thom categorises these applications as hard and soft applica-
<9
tions and provides several examples from physics, biology, etc.
^7Ibid,, p, 65,
These applications are discussed in E.C. Zeeman, "Applica­
tions of Catastrophe Theory," Tokyo International Conference on Manifolds 
{1973)} "Catastrophe Theory," op, cit.; "On the Unstable Behavior of 
Stock Exchanges," Journal of Mathematical Economios 1, 1197U); C.A. 1s- 
nard and E.C. Zeeman, "Some Models from Catastrophe Theory in the Social 
Sciences," op, cit.; T. Poston and A.S.R. Woodcock, "Zeeman's Catastro­
phe Machine," Proceedings of Cambridge Philosophical Society (197U), pp. 
211-220; I. Stewart. "The Seven Elementary Catastrophes.” Mew Scientist 
(Nov, 1975); L, Starobin, "Our Changing Evolution: Strategies for 19^ 0," 
General Systems 30CE (1976); W.S. Brown, "An Economic Application of 
Catastrophe Theory," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Colorado 
(1977), and T.A. OOLiva and C.M. Capdevielle, op. cit.
*9R. Thom (1977), op. cit.
TABLE I
CATASTROPHE CONTROLDIMENSIONS
BEHAVIOR
DIMENSIONS FUNCTION FIRST DERIVATIVE
FOLD 1 1 x* -  a
toa
g
CUSP 2 1 L * * - a x - i b x a x3 -  a -  bx
£
sO SWALLOWTAIL
3 1 i  -  ax- A bx* -  -1 cx* 9 2 3 x4 -  a -  bx -  cx2
BUTTERFLY 4 1 ^  x* -  ax -  L  bx1 -  i  cx3 -  L  dx* xs -  a -  bx -  cx* -  dx2
to
o
_l
fl
HYPERBOLIC 3 2 x* + y* + ax + by + exy 3xl  + a + ey 3y* + b + cx
ELLIPTIC 3 2 x, -x y * + a x  + by + cxi  + ey* 3x* - y1 + a + 2cx -2xy+  b + 2cy
3 PARABOLIC 4 2 x*y + y* + ax + by + cx*+dy*
2xy + a + 2cx 
x* + 4y* + b + 2dy
THE SEVEN ELEMENTARY CATASTROPHES 
(Source: E..C, Zeeman, 1976)
Catastrophe theory is not without its share of critics* The 
catastrophe models and the underlying mathematics hare been sharply 
criticised by a number of mathematicians.^0 Somewhat reminiscent of the 
persistent attack on general systems theory, the criticisms are not un­
expected. Thom calls his theory a kind of geometrical vitalism; to him 
catastrophe theory is more than mathematics. It is a philosophy, a way 
of looking at and describing the world which then demands its own mathe­
matics: "Catastrophe theory is not a mathematical theory, rather it deals
with mathematics*It is not a scientific theory, but rather a method
62leading to an art of models*
DISCUSSION
According to Zeeman:^ "The proof of Thom's theorem is a dif­
ficult one, but the results of the proof are relatively easy to compre­
hend* The elementary catastrophes themselves can be understood and 
applied to problems in the sciences without reference to the proof."
This statement appears to have merit and the criticisms of catastrophe
theory may accordingly be classified into two kinds: Criticisms that
deal with the mathematical foundations of the theory, and those that
deal with the effectiveness of the models. The first type lies in the
domain of mathematicians and cannot be overcame at the application level;
60For a summary of these criticisms see G.B. Kolata, "Catas­
trophe Theory: Hie Qnperor Has No Clothes," Science (April 1977)*
6h. Thom (1977), op. cit.
62
R. Thom (197$), op. cit., p. 323.
^E.C. Zeeman (1976), op. cit., p. 6$.
however, the effectiveness of the models nay be tested empirically. Ibis 
process Is consistent with the paradigm of scientific method, which is 
empirical-inductive in nature* The empirical validation exercises are 
also consistent with the systems approach, which proceeds from the parti­
cular to the general, and infers the design of the system by a process 
of induction and synthesis*^
The interesting aspect of catastrophe -theory is that it is 
qualitative and yet allows for dynamic investigation* This means that 
complex dynamic behavior can be modeled with only weak hypotheses* Ac­
cording to Than, "the type and dynamical origin of a catastrophe can be 
described even when all the internal parameters describing the system 
are not explicitly known,
Catastrophe models are perhaps the only ones that can handle 
discontinuities and divergences in behavior. For this reason alone, 
their descriptive effectiveness appears to be superior as compared with 
the existing models* However, an evaluation of catastrophe models would 
have to be accomplished through some empirical validation exercises, not 
by suppositions.
EXPLANATION OF THE CUSP CATASTROPHE MODEL 
By far, the most publicised of the seven elementary catastro­
phes is the cusp catastrophe, also known as the Riemann-Hugonio t catas­
trophe* The cusp model has been used to explain sudden changes in
*^J.P. van Gigch, Applied General Systems flieory (New York: 
Harper and Row, Inc., 19710, pp. 10-11.
£t*
R. Thom (1975), op. cit., pp. 60-61.
behavior resulting from a two-dimensional control. Mathematically, the 
cusp model is derived as follows.^ Let
(1)
where f(a,b,x) is the energy function,
x is the coordinate on the behavior space, and 
a, b are the coordinates on the control space.
The behavior surface M is given by
a - bx ■ 0 (2)
A singularity occurs when
- 3 x2 - b - 0 (3)
Equations (2) and (3; define the singularity set,which consists of two 
folds. Thus, the behavior surface has a fold curve F, in it, as shown 
in Figure 7* The projection of the fold curve F onto the control surface 
is called the bifurcation set B, The equation of B is given by elimi­
nating x from equations (2) and (3):
27a'2 ih)
Although F is a smooth curve, B has a cusp at the origin.
Zeeman^ has postulated that five properties characterise 
phenomena that can be described by the cusp model:
^Adapted from C.A. Isnard and B.C. Zeeman, op. cit. See 
also B.C. Zeeman (1973)*op. cit,
^B.C. Zeeman (1976), op. cit,, p. 70.
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THE CUSP MODEL 
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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1) Blaodality,
2) inaccessibility,
3) sodden transitions, 
k) hysteresis, and
i) divergence.
These properties may be identified as follows:
Consider a control point c - (a,b) along the path P1 on the 
control surface. If the control point c * (a,b) is outside the cusp 
then fQ (the value of the energy function at c) has a unique minimum) 
therefore M is single-sheeted over the outside of the cusp. For 
o - (a,b) inside the cusp, fQ has two minima separated by one maximum, 
thus N is triple-sheeted inside the cusp. However, the middle sheet is 
mathematically irrelevant since it represents naxima of f , hence repre- 
sents the inaccessible region for applications. The two minima repre­
sent two possible modes of behavior (bimodality). For example, a dog 
both angry and fearful may either attack or retreat.
Suppose the control point c is moved smoothly along the path
P., the behavior state x (the value of x at o) follows smoothly alongI' 0
the upper surface until it reaches a point A ■ (-3,2,1) on the fold 
curve, when it suddenly jumps to A* ■ (-3,2,-2) on the lower surface, 
after which it proceeds smoothly along the lower surface. This catastro­
phic change of behavior is called a sudden transition. A frightened dog 
in a situation in which its rage steadily increases, may suddenly attack. 
Figure VI shows the change in the sha^e of local energy function for 
values of b - -3,-2,...3,
At b - -3, the behavior state has the unique minimum x^  • At 
b - -2, a second minimum Xg appears, but equation (1) holds the state
in the first minimum Xj • Only when the second bifurcation occurs at
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FIGURE VI
CHANGES IN THE SHAPE OF LOCAL ENERGY FUNCTION 
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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b ■ 2, x1 becomes the maximum, and the equation (l) moves the state 
rapidly to If the control point is now moved along the path P1 in 
the opposite direction, the return jump is delayed until b - *2, This 
delay, due to hysteresis, increases as *a* decreases. This means that 
the dog suddenly attacks or retreats at different combinations of rage 
and fear.
The property of divergence can be observed by moving along 
the paths P2 and Py  At the beginning of the paths, the behavior states 
are close but are far apart at the end, P^  being on the lower surface 
and P2 on the upper surface. The two piths (which axe shown to be on the 
either side of the cusp point) do not experience any discontinuity during 
the movement.
68Zeeman has invented a device called "catastrophe machine1 
to explain the dynamics of the cusp catastrophe. The underlying prin­
ciple in the following description is that when the behavior of a system 
is subject to opposing forces, the system seeks a state of equilibrium 
at minimal energy. The process which keeps the system in this equili­
brium is called dynamic. The catastrophe machine, illustrated in Figure
69VII, has been analysed in detail by several authors.
The machine consists of a pivoted disc and two rubber bands 
attached to the edge of the disc to provide opposing forces. The free 
end of one piece is fixed, while the other moves freely and is called
68E.G. Zeeman, loo. cit.
^T. Poston and A.E.R. Woodcock, op. cit.; 1. Stewart, op. cit.; 
E.C. Zeeman, op. cit.; W.S. Brown, op. cit.
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FIGURE VII 
ZEEMAN'S CATASTROPHE MACHINE 
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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the control point. As this control point is moved in the plane of the 
disc, there is & smooth movement of the equilibrium position of the 
disc, with an occasional sudden jump in order to keep the potential ener­
gy between the rubber bands at a minimum. The positions of the control 
point at which the jumps occur constitute the bifurcation set. As long 
as the control point remains outside the cusp, the movement of the disc 
varies smoothly and continuously as a function of the control parameters. 
Even upon entering the bifurcation set, no sudden jump is observed. How­
ever, a catastrophe is certain to occur when the control point passes all 
the way through the bifurcation set. lhe cusp model of the catastrophe 
machine is shown in Figure VUX corresponding to the cusp closest to the 
disc. The model is simply a three-dimensional graph of equilibrium 
states z (angular positions of the diso) against the position of the 
control point.
The folded behavior surface represents the equilibria (minima 
of energy function). If the control point lies outside the bifurcation 
set, only one value of x is possible; but if it lies within the bifur­
cation set, then there are three values of x s one on the top sheet, 
one in the middle, and one on the bottom sheet. However, the dynamic 
holds behavior finnly on the top and bottom sheets, thus the middle sheet 
is said to be inaccessible. The dynamic also causes catastrophic jumps 
from one sheet to the other when the edge of the pleat is reached.
Within the bifurcation set, the values of x can be determined uniquely 
only when the direction of movement of control point is known. Stated 
differently, the behavior is bimodal in same part of its range. Also, 
the jump from the top sheet of the behavior surface to the bottom sheet
FIGURE Till 
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does not take place at the same position as the jump from bottom sheet 
to the top one, an effect called hysteresis* The cusp model thus implies 
the possibility of divergent behavior, that is, at the starting point 
(singularity) of separation between the two behavior surfaces, the sys­
tem is forced to adopt one of the two opposing behaviors*
AN APPLICATION OF THE CUSP MODEL TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SITUATIONS
70Oliva and Capdevlelle have attempted to map the important 
structural characteristics of the Stagner-Rosen model onto the cusp catas­
trophe* This mapping is accomplished by establishing that the cusp 
model end the Stagner-Rosen model are conceptually isomorphic.
1* Bimodality? In the Stagner-Rosen model, the control di­
mensions are the management and union demand intensi­
ties, and the bargaining behavior of the system ranges 
from lookout to strike* The bifurcation set, which is 
defined by the management and union tolerance limits, 
represents the bargaining zone. Formal negotiations 
take place in this area of biraodality.
2* Sudden transitions: During the formal negotiations, if
the management is acquiescent, unions demand intensity 
is likely to Increase gradually* However, a lockout 
would result if the management tolerance limit is ex­
ceeded, indicative of sudden (catastrophic) transition 
in the bargaining behavior of the system* On the other 
hand, if the management is militant and the union ac­
quiescent, a strike would result should the management 
continue to press its demands beyond the union toler­
ance limit*
3* hysteresis: The proceeding discussion indicates that
a strike would result if the union tolerance limit is 
exceeded, and a lockout would result if the management 
tolerance limit is exceeded. Stated differently, 
strike and lockout occur at different conbinations of 
union and demand intensities* Thus, catastrophic 
jumps (strike and lockout) take place at different
70T.A, Oliva and C.M. Capdevlelle, op* cit.
positions depending on the direction of movement
U« Inaccessibility: During formal negotiations, the bar­
gaining parties are expected to attempt to win as many 
of their respective demands as possible. Therefore, 
a state of neutrality in the bargaining behavior of 
the system is not consistent with the concept of bar­
gaining, and mould be the least likely behavior.
5. Divergence: As demand intensities are increased by 
both parties, formal bargaining begins. Ujpon reaching 
a singularity, a small difference in the bargaining 
behavior of the system would move the system onto 
either the strike prone trajectory or the lockout 
prone trajectory. Stated differently, feedback effects 
begin to slowly change the demand intensities, which 
can set the system on totally different courses.
Assuming that the proceeding arguments are correct, the collec­
tive bargaining situation can be investigated using a cusp model. This 
model is illustrated for this application in Figure IX. The bargaining 
behavior surface is given by the following equation:
1? ■ a ♦ hx 15)
where x is the bargaining behavior of the system,
a is the union demand intensity, and 
b is the management demand intensity.
SUMMARY
Concepts relating to bargaining behavior in general and collec­
tive bargaining behavior in particular were presented in this chapter, 
and various models were discussed. It was shown that the existing models 
were not fully adequate in describing the dynamics of formal negotiations. 
A new generation of models oalled catastrophe models were examined in 
general, and the cusp catastrophe model in particular. A conceptual iso­
morphism between collective bargaining behavior phenomenon and the cusp 
model was indicated as a possible approach to the investigation of the
FIGURE IX
CUSP MODEL FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING BEHAVIOR 
(Adapted from Zeeman, 1976)
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dynamics of formal negotiations* It was suggested that such an investi­
gation would also be Indicative of empirical verification of the useful­
ness of the ouap model.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the research methodology and procedures 
for the collection and analysis of data. The cusp catastrophe model for 
explaining the dynamic nature of collective bargaining behavior is re­
stated and a simulation of the collective bargaining process Is described 
as an approach to test the usefulness of the model. In this context, the 
working and formal hypotheses are stated and a measure of effectiveness 
is indicated. The method of data collection and the underlying proce­
dures are described, including subject selection, experimental design, 
and the simulation procedures for this research.
RESTATEMENT OF THE MODEL 
Based on Stagner-Rosen description and recent advances In 
catastrophe theory, a model for dealing with the dynamic aspects of 
collective bargaining behavior was suggested in the proceeding chapter. 
The model was derived by establishing an isomorphic relationship between 
the Stagner-Rosen model and the cusp catastrophe model. The Stagner- 
Rosen model postulates that both bargaining parties have certain expecta­
tions and tolerance limits which define a bargaining sonej as the parties 
bargain, they explore these limits in an effort to find an area in which 
a compromise is possible} and if these limits are exceeded, a strike or a 
lockout may result. The ousp catastrophe model recognises this coex­
it?
lstence of divergent behaviors in a system and explains the abrupt changes 
that semetines oocur In the system behavior by examining the cause and 
effect relationships that exist In the system*
In a collective bargaining process the effect may be defined 
as the bargaining behavior of the system* At any given stage of formal 
negotiations the system allows for divergent behavior* That is, the 
system may be assumed to exhibit a strike-prone behavior, or a lookout- 
prone behavior* Further, the system may sometimes exhibit sudden transi­
tions in its behavior indicative of failure of negotiations in the form 
of a strike or a lockout* Thus the effect may be defined as a continuum 
of system behavior ranging from a strike to a lockout, with various 
intermediate positions of strike-prone or lockout-prone behaviors* The 
cause may be defined in terms of control variables in the system si ch as 
management and union demand intensities (expectations). The cusp model 
attempts to explain the changes in the system behavior when the control 
variables are gradually changed*
The effect or the system behavior Is represented in the cusp 
model by a structurally stable topological surface (behavior surface) 
with a fold curve in it* The cause is a set of points (different combi­
nations of the control variables) on a control surface. The behavior 
surface is derived from this set in accordance with the following causal 
relationship:
xr3 - a + bx (l)
where x is the effect or the bargaining behavior of the system,
and a, b are the control variables (pause), namely, the union and 
management demand intensities respectively*
h9
The union and management tolerance limits are defined by the 
limits of the bifurcation set on the control surface* The area Inside 
the bifurcation set (the cusp) thus identifies the bargaining sons* In 
this zone the system behavior is bimodal, that is, the system has two 
possible modes of behavior, namely, strike-prone behavior and lockout- 
prone behavior*
If the control variables are gradually changed, there is a 
smooth movement In the behavior surface either in a strike-prone trajec­
tory or a lockout-prone trajectory* At the origin of the cusp, very 
small changes in the demand intensities can set the system on totally 
different courses* In this process, if the management is acquiescent, 
the union demand intensity is likely to increase gradually until the 
toleranoe limit of management is reached at which point a sudden transi­
tion in the system behavior could occur in the form of a lockout* 
Alternatively, if the union is acquiescent, a strike may eventually re­
sult, should the management continue to press its demands past the union 
tolerance limit*
To summarise, the cusp catastrophe model considers idle cause 
and effect relationship between the demand intensities and the system 
behavior for explaining the dynamic aspects of the collective bargaining 
phenomenon. The model attempts to explain divergent behavior and sudden 
transitions of behavior of the system*
Although the model has been explained in the context of union- 
management collective bargaining situations, it can be used to explain 
other collective bargaining type situations as well* For example, peace 
negotiations in international disputes can be modeled using the same
$0
logic of presentation* However, it is often difficult to devise a method­
ology to test the model in real life situations*
One possible approach to verify the usefulness of the model is 
through simulation of collective bargaining type situations in laboratory 
environments* Such simulations have their limitations, but serve as a 
first step in systematically examining certain aspects of the model and 
the dynamics of the process in general* Hie methodology outlined in this 
chapter involves a simulation of union-managemerrt collective bargaining* 
This simulation, called Collective Bargaining Qame, is described in 
Appendix A*
HYPOTHESES
The following working hypotheses concerning the impact of 
union demand Intensity (a) and management demand intensity (bJ upon the 
bargaining behavior of the system (x) were formulated for determining 
the effectiveness of the cusp catastrophe model in simulated bargaining 
situations:
Hypothesis 1: If 'a* is constant or decreasing and 'b' is rising,
then the system will exhibit strike-prone behavior, 
and an actual strike may eventually occur.
Hypothesis 2: If >b' is constant or decreasing and 'a1 is rising,
then the system will exhibit lockout-prone behavior, 
and an actual lockout may eventually occur*
Hypothesis 3: If 'a1 and *b» are both constant or are both in­
creasing or decreasing, then the system behavior 
will change smoothly, but feedback effects nay 
change *a' and/or 'b1 and induce behavior described 
in hypotheses 1 or 2*
In order to support or fail to support these working hypotheses, 
the following null hypothesis was formulated:
$■1
Noll hypothesis: The owp model Is a good fit for observed collective
bargaining behavior In simulated environment.
MEASURE OF EFFECTIVENESS 
TO test the «mi hypothesis, the Chi-square test for goodness 
of fit mas deployed. This test is based on how good a fit there is 
between the frequency of occurence of observations In an observed sample
(0) and the expected frequencies obtained from the hypothesised distribu­
tion (e). By comparing the observed frequencies with the corresponding 
expected frequencies, it Is possible to decide whether discrepancies 
between the two are likely to occur as a result of sampling fluctuations. 
It is common practice to refer to each possible outcome of an experiment 
as a cell. Strike-prone behavior and lockout-prone behavior are the two 
outcomes considered In this experiment. Thus, there are two cells (see
o
Table H). From the tabulated data, the quantity 5^  is computed (after 
applying Tates' correction for continuity)!
? C  <1o< " e<1 - °**>2
(Corrected) ■ ) 1   —
T ei
where o^ and e^ are the observed and expected frequencies respectively,
for the ith cell, and has 1 degree of freedom.
If the observed frequencies are close to the corresponding 
2
expected frequencies, the \  value will be small, Indicating a good fit. 
If the observed frequencies differ considerably from the expected fre-
2
quenoies, the X. value will be large and the fit is poor. A good fit
1
leads to the acceptance of the null hypothesis. For a level of signifi- 
canoe of ,0% the critical value of \  is found to be 3.31*1. Thus,
$2
TABLE II
CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR GOODNESS OF FIT
] Strike-Prone 
1 Behavior
i
Lockout-Prone 
Behavior
i ,
Observed frequency (o.) {
x i i
1
Repeated frequency (e.) !X i •
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X. >  3.8U1 constitutes the critical region, and falls in the right tail 
of the Chi-square distribution* This criterion, however, should not be 
used unless each of the expected frequencies is at least equal to 5*
THE METHOD OF DATA COLIBCTION
Objective
The objective is to gather data on management and union demand 
intensities, and the bargaining behavior of the system in a simulated 
collective bargaining process* The data on the demand intensities take 
the form of indioies* These indicies and the simulation are described 
in the following sections*
Definitions
tMon and Management Demand Intensities: These composite 
indicies 'a* and <b' are developed as simple averages of the following 
behavioral variables measured on a 11-point attitudinal scales extent 
of success in winning demands, extent of emotional involvement in the 
negotiations, extent to which concessions were made, extent of unwilling­
ness to compromise, and extent of apprehension as to the equity of nego­
tiations* Thus, the demand intensities are different from a set of 
demands. Additionally, the selection of components of demand intensities 
is not of critical importance In determining the usefulness of the cusp 
model, rather, the components need only be reasonable in a general sense* 
For example, an entirely different set of behavioral variables could have 
been selected, measured and averaged differently, without significantly 
affecting the methodology* Regression and other statistical techniques 
are available for variable subset selection, but there are disagreements
5U
among the contributors In thia area on the measure of "goodness" of the 
subset of variables selected. The purpose here is not to define a uni­
versally acceptable set of behavioral variables that constitute the 
union and management demand Intensities*
The union demand Intensity is determined by multiplying the 
average of the suggested variables by a factor of 1.5. This factor is 
based on -the union tolerance ratio of 2/3 suggested by diva and Capde­
vlelle.1 However, this correction factor is not of critical importance 
since the tolerance limits are believed to be elastic, but is helpful 
in conducting sensitivity analysis.
Impge4w4wg Behavior of the System* The expected bargaining 
behavior of the system, 'e', is determined according to the working hypo­
theses. That is, during the formal negotiations,
(1) If 'a' is constant or decreasing, and 'b* Is rising, 'e» 
would be strike-prone,
(2) if <b' Is constant or decreasing, and 'a* is rising, *e( 
would be lockout-prone,
(3) if 'a1 and 'b1 are both unchanged, 'e' is determined 
from the previous round of negotiations,
(U) If 'a' and *b' are both increasing, 'e' would be strike- 
prone if Increase in ’b* Is greater than increase in 'a1, 
and lockout-prone If increase in 'a' is greater than 
Increase in 'b',
(5) if 'a' and 'b' are both decreasing, ‘e1 would be strike- 
prone If decrease in 'a1 Is greater than decrease in 'b', 
and lookout-prone if decrease in 'b' is greater than 
decrease in 'a', and
(6) if 'a* and 'b* are both increasing or decreasing at the 
same rate, 'e' is determined from the previous round of 
negotiations.
The observed bargaining behavior of the system 'o' is olaasi-
T.A, Oliva and C.M. Capdevlelle, "Collective Bargaining as a 
Catastrophe Model," Revised paper presented at the Proceedings of Academy 
of Management (1977b) (Itopublished),
fled as strike-prone or lookout-prone according to the observed outcome 
of each round of formal negotiations. Determinants of the observed out­
come are, the perceptions of the subjects concerning the outcome (meas­
ured on a 10-point attitudinal scale: 0-U - strike-prone behavior; 5-9 • 
lookout-prone behavior) and the record of proceedings maintained during 
the negotiations*
Instruments for Data Collection
The instruments for data collection consist of a collective 
bargaining game and questionnaire on the progress of negotiations* This 
game consists of renegotiation of a hypothetical agreement (see Appendix
B) between pairs preselected subjects* The questionnaire (see Appendix
C) provides data on the participants' demand intensities and the observed 
behavior state of the system for each sample of hour-long round of formal 
negotiations*
Subjects
Hie subjects for the experiment were lUO undergraduate students 
enrolled in four sections of Management Principles and Policies course 
at Louisiana State University. Of these, 86 were male and 5U female, 
between ages of 19 and U6, including full-time and part-time students, 
the latter holding management, union or non-union jobs in various organi­
zations* The result was a rather heterogeneous sample* The subjects 
were induced to volunteer by offering them potential opportunities to 
earn up to 15 per cent extra oredit in the course depending on their 
success at negotiations plus the prospect of being exempted from their 
final examination in the course if they were most successful* lhe
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subjects nere not offered any monetary remuneration.
The subjects mere told that they could volunteer for partici­
pating in a collective bargaining game for extra credit in the course. 
They mere required to take a psychological test before being assigned to 
teams taking part in the game. The game mas scheduled to be played 
during the regularly scheduled class meetings and did not involve nega­
tive rewards except perhaps in terms of lost opportunity to inprove their 
grade in the course* The purpose of the experiment and the criteria for 
evaluating sucoess at negotiations mere not revealed to the subjects.
Experimental Design
The simulation consisted of 35 teams participating in the 
collective bargaining game. Each team had four subjects, two playing 
the role of management representatives, and the other two playing the 
role of union representatives. Procedures for assignment of subjects 
into teams are desoribed in the following sections.
Although the purpose of this experiment mas not aimed at dis­
covering personality effects on oolleotive bargaining behavior, it mas 
believed that some important functions mould be served if each of three 
basic personality types, namely, n-achisvement, n-affiliation, and n- 
dominance orientations, played each other in all possible combinations 
(a 3 x 3 design). A completely random assignment would have adequately 
served the purpose, but the 3 x 3 design allows for blocking of certain 
variables and rdduoes the variability in the experiment. Also this de­
sign mas believed to provide a representative sample to examine the 
entire spectrum of collective bargaining behavior. Same of the gaming
experiments aimed at Investigating personality effects on the collective 
bargaining behavior of the system lend support to tbe belief that per­
sonality orientations are at least a-priori determinants of the expected
2
bargaining behavior of the system.
Blocking
Personality Orientations: The design outlined above would
allow for blocking the secondary effects of personalities of single in­
dividuals, since the collective bargaining game involves systemic con­
figuration of personalities* That is, if pairs of subjects of a certain 
personality orientation were matched against every other types of pairs, 
there would be reduced sampling bias*
Predisposition of Subjects: Bach personality type was sub-
classified as being high or low on n-nurturance and n-eococathection. 
N-nurturanoe indicates an orientation toward compassion and sympathy for 
less fortunate persons, while n-exocathection generally shows a practical 
outlook with emphasis on results, wealth, position, and competition*
9uch subolassiflcations help to identify the predispositions of the sub­
jects with regard to management or union activities on the assumption 
that subjects are likely to have high n-nurturance if they sympathise 
with union activities in general, and high n-exocathection subjects are 
more likely to be biased in favor of management activities* Accordingly, 
pairs of subjects having high n-nurturanoe scores were designated as union 
representatives'* This procedure was believed to reduce the bias due to
2
Par more details see K.W. Terhune, "Motives, Situation, and 
International Conflict Within Prisoner's Dilemma,1 Journal of Personality 
and Social psychology. 8 (Mar* 1968).
the predispositions of the subjects on the nature of the experiment.
3ex: The effect of sex variable vas partially blocked by
forming all-male, all-female, and male-female combinations of teams for 
the experiment. Of the 3J> teams that took part In the experiment, 8 were 
all-male, 6 were all-female, and 21 in different male-female combina­
tions •
Motive Assessment and Grouping Procedures
The following personality orientations of the subjects were 
measured by responses to a psychological insight test questionnaire^
(see Appendix D):
Primary Orientations: 1) Achievement (n-ach)
2) Affiliation (n-aff)
3) Dominance (n-dom)
Secondary Orientations: U) Nurturance (n-nur)
f>) EXocathection (n-eoco)
Scoring of the questionnaires was done by averaging the scores on each
personality variable. Thus, each subject was classified into one of the
following six groups:
Management Predisposition: 1) n-ach; n-eoco
2) n-aff; n-eoco
3) n-dom; n-eoco
Union Predisposition: U) n-ach; n-nur
!>) n-aff; n-nur 
6) n-dom; n-nur
The subjects were further classified as 'high1, 'average', or 'marginal' 
examples of each orientation and also according to sex. Pairs of subjects
Adapted from H.A. Murray ( e d . o r a t ions in Personality 
(New York: Oxford Thiversity press, 1938), pp. 1U2-2U2; with permission 
of the publisher (see Page U?).
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from the first three groups were matched with pairs of subjects from the 
last three groups In nine possible ways, after allowing for blocking of 
sex and individual personality effeots (see Table III), The number of 
teams in each cell are indicated in the table.
Simulation procedures
After the subjects had been grouped into teams, each team was 
briefed on the collective bargaining game. The experimenter remained 
neutral and was unavailable for any consultations during the game.
The subjects were informed that the game oonslsted of formal 
negotiations between pairs of preselected subjects on cm existing labor 
contract. A H  the teams negotiated simultaneously on 20 articles of 
agreement in chronological order, taken one at a time. Bargaining was 
initiated with the statement of preferred solutions and continued until 
a mutual agreement was reached. The subjects were permitted to declare a 
strike or a lockout if the negotiations failed. At the end of each 
session, the two bargaining sides of each team independently reported 
progress on negotiations by responding to a questionnaire (see Appendix 
B), This questionnaire provided data on a 11-point scale by assessing 
the perceived demand Intensities of the management and union representa­
tives, and the actual bargaining behavior of the system. The subjeots 
were not permitted to introduce additional articles to the existing agree­
ment, that is, they negotiated only amendments to the existing articles.
To encourage active participation, the subjects were offered 
payoffs in potential extra credit (up to 1$% of the final grade) and were 
told that the most successful bargainers would be exempted from taking
TABLE III
THE 3 x 3 DESIGN
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the final examination In the course. The subjects were then given an 
opportunity to ask questions on the briefing*
The game consisted of a maximum of ten 1-hour sessions, al­
though most teams finished the game in less than eight sessions* The 
subjects were not given any feedback during the game on how successfully 
they were negotiating* Upon completion of the game, the extra credit 
for the management and union sides of each team was announced (as also 
the exeaptees from the final examination) and the subjects were debriefed 
on the game*
SUMMARY
Wbrklng and formal hypotheses, and measure of effectiveness 
for this research were stated in this chapter* The method of data collec­
tion and the underlying procedures were presented, outlining the experi­
mental design and the simulation procedures*
The cusp catastrophe model was explained in the context of 
collective bargaining situations* This model considers the cause and 
effect relationship between the demand intensities and the system behavior 
for explaining some of the dynamic aspects of the collective bargaining 
phenomenon, such as divergent behavior and sudden transitions in system 
behavior, A simulation approach was suggested for verifying the useful­
ness of the model. This simulation called the collective bargaining game 
was described and procedures for data collection were detailed to facili­
tate testing of goodhess of fit of the model,
A 3 x 3 experimental design was outlined and the procedures 
for subject selection, blocking, and the game were specified for imple-
mating data collection* The results and findings of this research are 
presented in the next chapter*
CHAPTER 17
RESULTS AMD FINDINGS 
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the data set, results, and findings 
of this study* First, the data set from the psychologlal insight test 
is presented in summary form and explained in terms of personality orien­
tations of subjects and the subject sources* The composition of the 35 
teams that took part in the simulation is also described. Second, the 
general results and the results of statistical analysis are presented*
The data set for the statistical analysis is included in the appendix* 
Finally, the findings of the study are listed* A discussion of these 
findings and the conclusions are Included in the next chapter*
SUBJECTS
Table 17 presents the mean personality orientation scores 
by the three subject groups n-aohes, n-affs, and n-doms. There were 
HU, US, and U8 subjects in the three groups respectively. The data did 
not indicate any clearcut personality orientation as the subjeots made 
significant scores on all of the orientations* However, the subjeots 
were classified into subject groups according to their highest score 
among the three personality orientations* Table 7 shows the composition 
of the subject groups by different sections of data source* Interesting­
ly, the proportion of subject groups in each section did not appear to 
be significantly different* This aspect was also reflected in the
TABLE IV
MEAN PERSONALITY ORIENTATION SCORES B7 SUBJECT GROUPS
n-ach n-aff n-don
n-achee
(n ■ 1*1*) 
n-affo 
(» - 1*8) 
n-dou 
(n - 1*8)
3.70
1.62
1.1*8
1.89
3.1*8
2.17
1.99
1.96
U.12
TABLE 7
COMPOSITION OF SUBJECT GROUPS BY SECTIONS OF DATA SOURCE
, n-ach n-aff n-dom
12 11* 11*
Section 2 8 12 12
Section 3 10 6 8
Section 1* 11* 16 11*
Total 1*1* 1*8 1*8
proportion of subjects in each group accounting for the two secondary 
personality orientations, n-nurturance and n-axocatheotion. The mean 
scores on these secondary orientations by subject groups are shown in 
Table VI. It can be seen that scores on n-nurturance appeared to be 
more pronounced than n-exocathection.
TABLE VI
MEAN SCORES ON SECONDARY ORIENTATIONS BT SUBJECT GROUPS
n-nur n-exo
n-aohes 3.73
n-affs 1*,09
n-doras 3.51
Based on the scores of the psychological insight test and 
other design considerations desorlbed in Chapter III, the 11*0 subjects 
were grouped into 35 teams. Refer to Table H I  in Chapter III for 
the number of teams in each cell of the 3 x 3  design.
RESULTS
General Results
The teams were in session on the average for 7.37 rounds of 
formal negotiations. Four teams concluded negotiations in six rounds,
111 teams in seven rounds, and 17 teams in eight rounds. The teans spent 
on the average about 22 minutes on each artlole in the contract, the 
most active bargaining being accounted for by the wage clause.
3.57
3.10
3.U9
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The affect of actual payoff on bargaining behavior was blooked 
since the subjects were not told the breakdown of extra credit points 
between the 20 articles of agreement* They were also not informed the 
criteria of evaluation of success at bargaining. However, the subjects' 
perceptions of the relative Importance of the various articles and the 
corresponding payoff promoted active bargaining. The actual payoff by 
articles of agreement for the winning side of a team are presented in 
Table VII. There was no payoff for the losing side. The criterion for 
evaluating sucoess at negotiations depended on whether there was a 
substantial shift In policy by either side from status quo. For this 
purpose, articles 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 17, and 19 In the existing 
contract were assumed to be In favor of management, and articles 3, lU, 
and 18 in union's favor. Thus, In order to win one of the articles that 
was a-priori in one's favor, it was only necessary to bargain for status 
quo. For the article on wages, however, this criterion was slightly modi­
fied, that is, if the mutually agreed wage rates showed an increase of 
less than 50 per cent over the existing rates, then management was deemed 
to have been successful. An increase of over 50 per cent made the union 
the winner. Based on these criteria, the records of proceedings were 
examined and the payoff was computed for each team (see Table Till).
This table reveals that the union representatives were overall winners 
in 22 teams, and the management representatives in 13 teams. In terms 
of the cells of the 3 x 3  design, this result is presented in Table IX.
TABLE VII
PAYOFF SCHEDULE BY ARTICIBS OF AGREEMENT
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Article Winner's payoff
1 2
2 0
3 2
k 0
S S
6 0
7 0
8 1S
9 S
10 2
11 0
12 h
13 0
1U 2
IS 0
16 2
17 2
18 U
19 s
20 0
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TABLE VIII 
PAYOFF EARNED BT TEAMS
Team Management Union
1 8 1*2
2 21* 26
3 23 27
a 20 30
5 2 1|8
6 9 U1
7 28 22
8 12 38
9 12 38
10 15 35
11 20 30
12 12 38
13 27 23
n* 20 30
15 18 32
16 20 30
17 17 33
18 30 20
19 1*2 8
20 30 20
21 35 15
22 20 30
23 15 35
2U 20 30
2$ 28 22
26 39 11
27 3* 15
28 1*2 8
29 30 20
30 15 35
31 21 29
32 9 1*1
33 29 21
31* 32 18
y> 22 28
TABLE IX
WINNERS OP THE GAME BY PERSONALITY ORIENTATIONS
Cell Management Union
n-ach vs n-&eh 0 3
n-ach vs n-aff 0 $
n-ach vs n-dom 1 2
n-aff vs n-ach 1 3
n-aff vs n-aff 2 1
n-aff vs a-don 1 3
n-dan vs n-aeh 2 2
n-don vs n-aff It 1
n-don vs n-don 2 2
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Results of Statlstioal Analysis
Table X (see Appendix B ) presents the data set showing the 
union and management demand intensities, the expected and observed 
bargaining behavior of the system for each sample. The bargaining 
behavior is indicated as either strike-prone 's', or lockout-prone 'l1. 
Bach sample consisted of an hour-long round of negotiations. Thus the 
data set consisted of 258 samples, being the total of 6 to 8 hour-long 
rounds of negotiations by each of the 35 teams.
The expected bargaining behavior was determined as follows:
If 'a* is Constant or decreasing, and 'b* is rising, 'o' would be strike- 
prone 's'. For example, in sample 3, 'a' decreased from 11.1 to 10.5, 
while 'b* increased from 5.0 to 6.1», thus *e' was classified as 's'.
If 'b* is constant or decreasing, and 'a' is rising, 's' would be lookout- 
prone <1'. For example, in sample 2, »b* decreased from 6.U to 5*0, 
while «a« increased from 10.8 to 11.1, thus 'e* was said to be 'I1.
If 'a* and 'bf are both unchanged, *e* would be determined from the 
previous round of negotiations. For example, In sample 22, ’a' and 'b* 
were both unchanged, thus 'e' was determined from sample 21, which 
happened to be 'l1* If 'a' and 'b' are both increasing, »e' would be 
•s' if Increase in »b* is greater than increase in 'a*, and ’I' if 
increase in 'a' is greater than increase in 'b'. Consider sample 7 
as an exajqple of '1', Where 'a' increased from 10.5 to 11.U, while *b* 
increased by a lesser amount from lt.O to I*.2. Also notice sample 37 
where ’s' was estimated on the basis of relative lnoreases in 'a* and *b'. 
If 'a* and 'b* are both decreasing, 'e' would be 's' if decrease in 'a' 
is greater than decrease In 'b', and if decrease in 'b' is greater
71
than decrease in 'a*. For example, in sample 2£, 'a* decreased from 
10.8 to 7*2, while 'b' decreased by a lesser amount from 8,0 to 6.6, 
thus 'e* was classified as 's'. Sample 28 is an example of the second 
situation. Finally, if 'a* and 'b' are both increasing or decreasing 
at the same rate, *e* is determined from the previous round of negotia­
tions. For example, in sample 218, both 'a' and 'b* decreased by an 
equal amount of 0.6, then ’e1 was estimated from sample 217, which 
happened to be '1'.
The observed bargaining behavior was classified as 's' if 
the teams scored it between aero and four, and '1* if the scores were 
between five and nine. This information was recorded at the end of 
each round of negotiations.
Of the 2£8 samples, the observed frequency of strike-prone 
behavior was 96, and 162 showed lockout-prone behavior. The expected 
frequencies were 112 and 1U6 respectively for strike-prone and lockout- 
prone behaviors (see Table XI). applying the Chi-square significance 
test it was found that the corrected X^had a value of 3.0£1 •
The data set was also classified h7 the two segments of the 
behavior surf awe, the strike-prone surface and the lockout-prone surface. 
The objective here was to test the two surfaces separately for goodness- 
of-fit. Recalling the three working hypotheses listed in Chapter III, 
the data points that conformed to hypothesis 1 and the relevant part of 
hypothesis 3 were tabulated in terms of expeoted and observed frequencies. 
These data points pertained to the strike-prone surface. The results 
are shown in Table XU. Notice that the observed frequencies of strike- 
prone behavior were £6 and 3£ for hypotheses 1 and 3 respectively, while
TABLE XX
CHI-SQUARE TEST FOR GOODNESS OF FIT
Strike-Prone 
Behavior (s}
Lockout-Prone 
Behavior (1)
Observed 
Frequency (o^ ) 96 162
Sxpected 
Frequency (e^ ) 112 11*6
Significance
Test v  ^\  - 3.0*1
Significance
Level m ,0?
Power of the 
Test - 90.1 %
TABLE XII
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR STRIKE*PRONE SURFACE
hypothesis 1 hypothesis 3
Observed 
Frequency (o^ ) 56 35
Expected 
Frequency (e^ ) 72 Uo
Significance
Teat X? ■ 3.71*5
Significance
level - .0?
7k
the expected frequencies were estimated to he 72 and UO. Sir applying 
the Chl-sqokre significance test it was found that the correeted X-?~ 
had a value of 3*7k$.
Dy a similar procedure, data points that conformed to hypothe­
sis 2 and the relevant portion of hypothesis 3 were tabulated. These 
data points pertained to the lookout-prone surface. The observed and
expected frequencies were 71, 7$, 76, and 70 respectively for the two
%•
hypotheses. The corrected had a value of 0.1*389 (see Table XIII).
Three instanoes of declared strike and two of lockout were 
observed during the simulation. In each of these oases the observed and 
expected system behavior were identical. These deadlocks were resolved 
by the arbitrator, and the teams were allowed to continue negotiations.
FINDINGS
The results support the null hypothesis that the cusp model 
is a good fit for observed collective bargaining behavior in simulated 
bargaining situations. The Chi-square significance teat indicated that 
the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of the 
two behavior states, the strike-prone and the lookout-prone behaviors, 
are statistically insignificant. The power of the test was 90.1 per cant. 
The segments of the behavior surf ace.independently showed a good fit for 
observed bargaining behavior, thus supporting all of the working hypothe­
ses. Further, in the five instances of failure of negotiations, the 
observed and expected system behaviors were identical. This result 
indicated that the cusp model is effective in describing sudden transi­
tions in system behavior.
TABLE XIII
GOODNESS 07 FIT TEST FOE LOCKOUT-PRONE SURFACE
Rypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3
Obaavved
Frequency (o^) 71 75
Expected 
Frequency (e^ ) 76 70
Significance
Teat - -U38?
Significance
Laval - . 0$
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It was observed that the cusp model was basically applicable 
for individual data points in the data set. Doe to the nature of 
experimental design, these data points were discrete and mutually 
exclusive, the reasoning here is that since the negotiations did not 
take place continuously over time, being scheduled at week-long intervals 
and since the subjects discussed different articles of agreement in 
different rounds, the system behavior could not be tracked over the 
duration of the game by individual teams in order to observe catastrophic 
changes in behavior. It would have been necessary for the experimenter 
to manipulate the control variables 'a', and *b' over time (a steady 
increase or decrease of one or both of the variables) to facilitate 
a smooth movement on the behavior surface leading to a catastrophe. 
Furthermore, the initial conditions of the simulation stipulated that 
the movement on the control surface started at the origin of the cusp, 
which made it difficult to determine the direotion of movement of the 
control point. Ideally, if the control point is moved from outside the 
bifurcation set into and across the cusp, a smooth movement on the 
behavior surface leading to a catastrophe could be observed.
However, an attempt was made to track the five observed 
catastrophes to observe the treads in system behavior over time.
As expected, the movement on the behavior surface was not smooth and 
consistant results were not observed. Thus one of the findings is 
that a smooth and continuous movement of the control point is necessary 
to plot the system behavior over time.
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The results were supportive of the Stagner-Rosen model for 
collective bargaining behavior* This finding was supported by the fact 
that although the system behavior was either strike-prone or lookout- 
prone, mutual agreement was possible in an area of compromise.
The results appeared to indicate that perceptions about the 
potential payoff were reflected in the demand intensity patterns of the 
subjects, which in turn influenced the system behavior. The effect of 
personality orientations on the system behavior indicated some pattern 
of consistency, but no hypotheses were tested to ascertain the degree 
of consistency.
SUMMARY
The results and findings of the study were presented in this 
chapter. A data set of 2<>8 samples was analysed to determine the good- 
ness-of fit of the cusp model in simulated bargaining situations. The 
results revealed that there was a good fit.
Some general results and the results of the psychological 
Insight test ware also included in the chapter. The results related to 
the outcome of the simulation, payoff earned by various teams, and the 
personality orientations of the winners in each team. These results were 
not tested for statistical significance. A discussion of the findings 
and the conclusions of the study are presented in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND HKCOKMKNDATIONS 
DISCUSSION
The results appear to show that experimental verification of 
the descriptive effectiveness of catastrophe models can successfully b e 
undertaken. It was shown that the cusp model Is a good fit for observed 
bargaining behavior in laboratory environments. Although the results 
pertained to laboratory type of situations, it Is believed that the cusp 
nodal oould be used to all types of bargaining behavior.
The cusp nodel appeared to be superior to the existing des­
criptive and normative nodels. first, the ousp nodal Is mathematically 
elegant and can deal with nnlti-valuadness of variables* Seeond, it is 
a dynamic nodel and permits simulations to be conducted. This aspect 
nay have implications for policy formulation. In this sense, the ousp 
nodel has potential to be used as a normative model. As a descriptive 
model, it is effective In describing phenomena involving sudden transi­
tions* Finally, the model is based on sound scientific logic, on as­
sumptions that do not appear to be unrealistic, and nay be verified with 
relatively weak hypotheses* The nodel is both qualitative and quanti­
tative.
Being one of the first attanpts at empirical investigation of 
catastrophe models In the field of social sciences, it is difficult to 
evaluate tine Impact of this study on a comparative basis* All that can
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be said at this stage is that the cusp model has considerable potential 
in describing phenomena involving sadden transitions•
The data implied frequent movement from the strike-prone sur­
face to the lockout-prone surface, and vice versa. This implication may 
erroneously suggest that catastrophic changes of behavior occur in the 
system rather frequently. However, a closer look at the description ol 
the collective bargaining game Indicates that the different rounds of 
negotiations were scheduled at week-long intervals,therefore each round 
had to be construed as a discrete data point. The subjects discussed 
different articles of the contract in different rounds. Therefore, the 
model was pertinent to each round rather than the entire game. In this 
sense, the rounds of negotiations were mutually exclusive, Accordingly, 
except in *> oases out of 2?8, catastrophes were not observed.
The effect of payoff and personality orientations were not 
tested statistically. This does not pose a serious problem since the 
methodology permits use of any given set of variables. This explanation 
also serves to counter any criticisms that may arise as to the effective­
ness/adequacy of the consonants of the control variables 'a' and 'b'.
Another possible criticism concerns the choice of dichotomous 
behavior states, the strike-prone and the lookout-prone behaviors. The 
choice of dichotomous behavior states is a very Important feature of this 
study since the cusp model, by definition, allows only two stable behavior 
states. However, the findings Indicate that strlke-proneness or lockout- 
promaness does not necessarily eliminate the possibility of mutual agree­
ment in the foem of a compromise solution. Such solutions may be reached
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far various reasons, the Implication here is that the system behavior 
could be strike-prone or lookout-prone even when there is mutual agree­
ment. This finding provides a possible explanation as to why the nego­
tiators sometimes experience dissonance and dissatisfaction at the 
solutions they agreed upon. This possibility is not reoognised in the 
Stagner-Rosen model.
The payoff system used in the simulation is rather difficult 
to defend. Host researchers prefer to use monetary remuneration for 
payoff in gaming experiments. The use of extra credit points for motiv­
ating the euhjeots to participate in the game was based on the supposi­
tion that given an opportunity a student would like to make the best 
possible grade in the course. A review of the records of proceedings of 
the various teams that took part in the game appeared to support this 
supposition.
The major value of the results is in the relative success at 
validation of a complex model for a complex process. The cusp model was 
shown to be of operational value in application situations* More spe­
cifically, the cusp model appears to hare considerable potential in the 
modelling of conflict processes.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Some treads do emerge from this study which give direction to 
constructing a new methodology for describing conflict processes. Based 
on the results it would appear that the ousp model adds a new dimension 
to the existing descriptive and normative models of collective bargain­
ing type behavior. While the results cannot be interpreted to provide
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any specific measures of accuracy, the chances of obtaining inaccurate 
descriptions would be smaller. The experimental design and sample sise 
of 2 8^ taken In this study can only be construed to indicate the possible 
usefulness of the cuep nodel but cannot provide conclusive evidence to 
establish its superiority over other models* liras, based on the United 
results of this study, it would be inappropriate to draw conclusions re­
garding the degree of superiority of the cusp nodel over other models* 
What is warranted from the results Is the continuation of additional 
studies involving the ousp model*
Further study of the ousp model using much larger sample sices 
and alternative designs might establish the descriptive effectiveness of 
the cusp model more conclusively* Also, more realistic results could be 
obtained by gathering data from real-life situations than from simulated 
situations, as well as situations where system behavior is tracked over 
tine* The validity of results of this study may have been inhibited by 
the use of undergraduate students as surrogates for union and nanagement 
representatives* However, it must be noted that the feasibility of field 
studies involving managers and union representatives appears to be rather 
limited because of the extreme difficulty involved in monitoring the 
bargaining process and the probe effects* Furthermore, if the cusp model 
should not prove useful, it nay not mean catastrophe theory is not valid* 
The cusp model is restricted to two independent variables and 
two behavior states* Further work in a higher dimensional space might 
be of more practical value* For example, the butterfly catastrophe model 
has four independent variables and three stable behavior states*
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Zeeman1 boa suggested an application of the butterfly nodel in wage bar­
gaining situations.
2
The butterfly nodel is derived aa foil ova t Let
f(a,b,c,d,x) - V 6  x6 - ax - 1/2 hoc2 - 1/3 ex3 - 1 A  d*1* (1)
where f(a,b,e,d,x,} is the energy function, x ia the coordinate on
the behavioral apace, and a,b,c,d are coordinates on the control space.
The behavior surface M ia given by
» X** - a - bx - ca? - dx3 - 0 (2)
The four control factors are called
a ■ Bernal factor (union denand intensity), 
b ■ Splitting factor (management denand intensity), 
c » Bias factor (position in the firm), and 
d - Butterfly factor (tine),
When the butterfly factor is negative (d <  0) then the tern 
swamps the x^ term, forming a cusp. The effect of the bias factor o is
merely to bias the position of the cusp. When the butterfly factor be­
comes positive (d >  0) then the x^ tern conflicts with the x^ tern and 
causes the cusp to bifurcate into three cusps enclosing a pocket.
This pocket corresponds to the emergence of a third stable 
behavior state and represents a compromise behavior midway between the 
two extremes behaviors represented by the upper and lower surfaces of the 
cusp (see Figure X). In the wage bargaining situation, the individuals
'Ht.C. Zeenan, "Catastrophe Theory," Scientific American (April, 
1976). See also by the sane author, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory," 
Triqro International Conference on Manifolds (1973).
2Adapted fron E.C. Zeenan, ibid. The notation is quite similar
to one used in deriving the cusp model in Chapter II.
V 
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FIGURE I 
THE BUTTERFLY MODEL
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in the firm are represented by a cloud of points on the behavior surfaoe 
moring steadily In the direction of tins. For t <  0 the cusp catas­
trophe represents the polarisation of opinion between the union1 a demands 
and masagegnsnb's offer. For t > 0 the compromise pocket emerges and 
as tine progresses the pocket grows and more individuals fall into the 
pocket, that is, experience the catastrophe from an extreme opinion to 
the compromise opinion* For a given value of bias, the compromise opinion 
differs sharply from the extreme opinions* A wage bargain Is struck when 
sufficient individuals fall into the pookst*
A preliminary study was conducted to examine the above des­
cription using a methodology similar to the one described in Chapter IXL 
A simulation called wage Bargaining Qame was designed to study the good­
ness of fit of the butterfly model in simulated wage bargaining situa­
tions (see Appendix F). The objective here was to verify the emergence 
of the third stable behavior state representing compromise behavior* 
Accordingly, the data were collected in successive rounds of negotiations 
on the number of subjects moving toward compromise behavior* The results 
at t*l, t*2 and t-3 are presented in Table XI7* The expected number of 
subjects moving toward compromise behavior was estimated on the basis of 
the bias factor, for example, at t - 1, all those representing positions 
above the rank of supervisor were expected to vote for a compromise. The 
observed number of subjects moving toward compromise behavior was deter­
mined from the ballots that were cast at the end of each round*
The results were encouraging and indicated that the butterfly 
model was a good fit in wage bargaining situations In simulated environ­
ments. The corrected ^  values of 3*1*37, 0*061*3, and 2.752 at t * 1,2,3
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TABLE XIV
GOODNESS OF FIT TEST FOR THE BUTTERFLY MODEL
Butterfly 
Factor (t) nrequwMy Compromise No Coraprood.se
1 Observed (on ) 
Expected (e^ )
1*5
35
95
105
2 Observed (o.g) 
Expected (e^ 2)
68
70
72
70
3 Observed (o.,) 
Expected (ejJ)
Uli
105
26
35
Significance
Tost Xt-i ■
2
^  t»2
2
X * " 3  ’
3.U37
0.06U3
2.752
Significance
Level - .05
Power of the 
Test m .721*
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respectively ware not statistically significant. However, the power of 
the test was only 72 *U per cent, being accounted by the relatively small 
sanple else of ll|0. This limited finding strongly suggested the need for 
farther research In this area on a larger seals*
Farther Improvement of the experimental design is warranted In 
future research. The Thematic Apperception Test would be a more precise 
instrument for measuring personality orientation of the subjects. Although 
a design based on personality orientation appears to be more elegant, a 
completely random assignment of subjects into teams might provide some 
insight Into the extent of personality effects upon bargaining behavior. 
Also, selection of subjects from a source other than student population 
might lend greater validity to the results* The simulation could be de­
signed so as to allow plotting of the catastrophes over time. Finally, 
monetary payoff schedules and large sample sizes would lend greater credi­
bility to the results and findings*
SUHM&RT
In any event, the existing models have some limitations in 
describing collective bargaining type behavior. The descriptive models 
appeared to be static, and there appear to be controversies about rele­
vance of game-theoretic conclusions to collective bargaining type situa­
tions* Furthermore, these models appear to be less effective in dealing 
with sadden Changes in behavior* Thus, the catastrophe models appear to 
be more appropriate for studying confliot processes* Further research on 
the validity of these models would be useful and nay have relevance in 
many fields*
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n* main thrust of this study boo been to suggest a tool for 
use by the system scientists, social scientists, and students of bargain­
ing behavior. For this purpose, some of the catastrophe models have been 
described, A methodology was outlined for testing the descriptive effec­
tiveness of one of the models (the cusp model). However, further study 
on a much larger scale would be helpful in making these models opera­
tional in a practical sense. This preliminary study has clearly demons­
trated the need for more definitive research on the usefulness of catas­
trophe models. Hopefully, it is the first step in the attempt at empiri­
cal verifications of the value of same of the catastrophe models in 
business research.
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APPENDIX A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING QAME
The game is played by tecuos of four* Two members are designated to 
play the role of management representatives and the other two, union re­
presentatives, The game consists of renegotiating an existing union 
contract (Appendix BJ. The conbraot has 20 articles and each article 
will be considered in chronological order, taken one at a time. Bargain­
ing is initiated with the statement of preferred solutions and continues 
until a mutual agreement is reached# During the negotiations, teams are 
permitted to adjourn for consultations# If the teams adjourn three times 
without reaching an agreement, the negotiations are deemed to have failed# 
This failure nay take the form of a declaration of a strike or a lock­
out# If the teams reach mutual agreement on all of the 20 articles, or 
if the negotiations break down, the game is over for the respective teams# 
Except under unusual circumstances, a lyj"1™  of 10 one-hour sessions 
will be allowed for the game, and the participants nay not introduce ad­
ditional articles to the existing agreement, l#e#, they negotiate only 
amendments to the existing articles#
At the end of each round of negotiations, the teams are required to 
provide the following information to the experimenter:
1) A stannary of proceedings during the round, indicating number of 
articles discussed, the Initial demands on each article by 
management and union, and the mutually acceptable solution (if 
reached). Should there be a breakdown of negotiations, the 
last positions of the management and union must be indicated,
2) The management and union representatives separately fill out a
questionnaire (Appendix C) at the end of each round#
3) At the end of the game, the teams report the changes in the
existing agreement, if any, that are mutually agreed upon, and 
the actual result of the game# The actual result could take 
idle form of a mutual agreement or a declaration of strike/lock­
out#
The game is triggered after the participants have examined the exist­
ing agreement and formulated their respective overall strategies. The 
management and union representatives are encouraged to write down their 
maxiaim and mini man acceptable demands on each article, along with argu­
ments favoring these demands# For this purpose, the participants are 
encouraged to oite current industry and other socio-teohnical data. Pay­
off schedule for the participants is as follows:
1) A maximum of £0 points of extra credit may be earned by the
participants by winning their respective demands during the 
negotiations# For this purpose, each article in the agree­
ment has a potential payoff#
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2) A maximum of 30 points will be awarded as a bonus credit for 
the overall winning side of each team*
3) A maximum of 20 points will be awarded to all participants for 
the reports they make during and after the game*
U) The most suooeaaful pair of bargainers in the class will be 
exeapted from the final examination in Management 3159*
£) In ease of breakdown of negotiations, as in the cases of de­
claration of strike or lockout, the amount of extra credit 
that the participants may be elegible for will be determined 
by an arbitrator* Professor T*A* Oliva, Department of Manage­
ment, has kindly agreed to be the arbitrator*
6) The extra credit earned in this project may not exceed l£ per 
cent of the final grade in the semester*
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APPENDIX B
A G R E E M E N T
ABO CORPORATION, Baton Rouge, herein individually referred to as the 
MCompany", and collectively as the "employer," and ABC WORKERS UNION, 
herein referred to &a the "Union," agree as follows:
Article I d : Coverage
The bargaining unit is made up of all production and maintenance employees 
of the employer, excluding professional, managerial, supervisory, and 
clerical employees.
Article 1021 Term
The term of this agreement begins on April 1, 1976, and continues through 
March 31, 1978, On. or before February l, 1978, one party officially 
notifies the other party, in writing, that it wants to end it.
Article 1031 Recognition of Union and Management Functions
The employer recognises the union as the exclusive representative of all 
employees covered by this agreement for the purpose of collective bargain­
ing with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other 
conditions of employment. Die union recognises that the employer has the 
right,. on its own Initiative, to perform any function of management at 
any tine, so long as it does not violate any provision of this agreement.
Article IQUi Tfork stoppages
There shall be no lookouts or strikes under any circumstances during the 
term of this agreement.
Article 10$: Grievance Procedure
A claim that the company has violated this agreement is forfeited unless 
it is presented within 10 calendar days after the alleged violation oc­
curs. This is true even though a continuing violation is alleged. Union 
may present the grievance in writing to the department head concerned.
If the department head does not hear the grievance within 10 days after 
the request, the union may arrange a conference with the manager. The 
answer made by the company must be in writ ting. The company's answer is 
final and binding, and no provisions for appeal or arbitration are pro­
vided herein.
Article 106: Order must be obeyed
When an employee feels aggrieved because of an order, he shall neverthe­
less obey the order, provided it does not involve serious danger to life.
Article 107: Holidays
The following days are on holiday list: New Year's Day, Good Friday,
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Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christ­
ina Day* An employee Is eleglble for holiday benefits unless he is 
absent without permission or Is on leave of absence. The company may 
decide which Jobs normally operate and which jobs normally close down on 
holidays*
Article 108: Pay
In the normal oircmastanees, each employee shall be paid his rate In the 
classification he is working for all time payable*
Except where this agreement says otherwise, straight time shall be payable 
for time worked, and when absent for these reasons:
Article 109: Overtime
Time and one-half shall be payable after the UO-hour period In a work­
week* The employer may schedule an employee for overtime work with or 
without prior notice* In the normal circumstances, such overtime is 
worked after eight hours have been worked In the day*
Article 110: Hours
The workweek is a period of five consecutive days beginning with Monday* 
The working period is 7:U*> a*m* to U:l£ p#m* with a 30 minutes lunch 
break* In unusual circumstances, the employer may change the workweek 
and the working period*
Article 111: Service
In the normal circumstances, an employee's service accumulates in his 
regular classification*
Article 112; Conditions which temporarily interrupt service
An employee is absent under conditions which temporarily interrupt service 
when he Is absent from work, unless the absence is with permission, Is 
followed by a return to work without interruption of employee status and
Classification Rate/hour
Auto mechanic
Machinist
Carpenter
Helper
Millwright
Operator
Pipefitter
Vfelder
$ 1»*38 
$ U.38 
$ U.38 
$ 2*75 
$ U*38 
$ U.38 
$ U.38 
$ U.38
1) Death in the family
2) Conferring wild) management
3) Vacation
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appears on tne following list:
1) An absense Which has continued for not more than 10 
consecutive calendar days.
2) An absence for active military service,
3) An absence while on loan by the company.
k) An absence for sickness or accident of the employee, 
provided a doctor certifies that the absence is 
necessary.
5) An absence for vacation.
Article 113: Proof of service
in computing service, the records of personnel administration department 
shall be conclusive.
Article lllit Seniority
One employee has higher job service than another employee if
1) He has longer service of the kind in question, or
2) Service of the kind in question is equal, and he has more service 
of the highest lower kind.
For purposes of determining seniority, all classifications are considered 
equal.
Article 115 s Qualification
It is the function of management to fix the qualifications for each job 
and post, The determination of abilities and qualifications of an em­
ployee shall be made by the company. The company may select an employee 
of less seniority for a higher job on the basis of ability and qualifi­
cations rather than on the basis of seniority alone.
Article 116: Layoff
Before laying off employees, the company will notify the union of the 
impending layoff at least one month before its effective date. Employees 
scheduled for layoff will be permitted to voluntarily retire, provided 
they can qualify for early retirement, or voluntarily resign and receive 
severance pay.
Article 117: Assignment
It is the function of management to assign employees to jobs, classifica­
tions, training, and transfer. Such assignments shall be made by the 
company based on abilities, qualifications, seniority, and prevailing 
circumstances.
Article 1181 Vacation
An employee is eleglble for vacation during a particular calendar year if 
his total service since the date of his employment or reinstatement is
one year or more. An eligible employee Is entitled to at least two weeks 
of vacation as follows:
Tears of total service 'Masks of vacation  2--------less than f>
$
10
20
3
k
$
The vacation shall he scheduled according to a preselected vacation list 
in one period, except in unusual circumstances* Deadline for making 
selections shall be April 1 of each year* Weekends and holidays shall 
not be excluded from vacation period. When the calendar year ends, the 
employee loses all of the vacation he has not yet taken. In unusual 
circumstances, the company may recall an employee on vacation.
Article 119: Miscellaneous
The company may discipline an employee if he commits one of the posted 
offenses, with or without advance notice. Bren though an employee does 
not commit a posted offence, his conduct or work performance may still 
be a cause for discipline. When the company disciplines an employee, it 
may lqpoBe any penalty which it deems appropriate. If the penalty imposed 
is discharge or suspension in excess of 10 working days, the employee may 
appeal to determine if the penalty was Imposed after due process; however, 
reasonableness of penalty itself will not constitute ground for appeal.
Neither the company nor the union shall discriminate against any employee 
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin or because of 
membership or nommemberahip in any labor organisation. The company will 
also not discriminate or penalise in any way any union representative or 
any member of the bargaining unit because of any action taken by him in 
pursuant to the provisions of this agreement.
Article 120: Benefit plan
Nothing in this agreement shall affect the company's benefit plan (a. 
Annuity plan; b. long-term disability insurance plan; c. Accidental death 
benefit plan; d. Contributory group life insurance plan; e. Family health 
insurance plan) or the administration thereof. The union waives its 
rights to bargain the provisions of the company's benefit plan.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this agreement to be executed 
at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, on this 31st day of March, 1976.
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Wttneaeea: ABC Corporation. Baton Rouge
(gjgned)________________  Bjjr (signed)
Manager
(yicmad') Assistant Manager
t.,.— n________________
— Ksnasa
Secretary-Treasurer
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APPENDIX C
PROGRESS ON NEGOTIATIONS
Teaa # _______ Names: ______________
Hound # _ _ _ _ _  Date:
Directions: Read each of the following questions carefully and evaluate 
the day's progress by placing an x on the scales given (.0 - to no 
extent, £ * to some extent, and 10 - to a very great extent):
0 1 2  3 H  6 7 8 9 10
1* To what aafteat were you success-
ful in winning your demands? . . • . _ _ _ ____________________
2, To what extent did you hare to
make concessions during this round? ___________________________
3* How would you evaluate your un­
willingness to o omproad.se on the 
issues discussed in this round? • . _____
U* To what extent were you emo- 
tionally involved in the negotia­
tions? • * • • « • • •  # • • • • •  * _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ — _
J>* To what extent were you appre­
hensive as to the equity of nego­
tiations?    ............ ________________________
6. In an overall sense, how would 
you charaetottse the energing trends 
in the negotiations? (0 - strike
inevitable, 9 * lookout inevitable) _________________________
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APPENDIX 0
PSTCHOLOOIGAL INSIGHT TEST 
(Adapted from H.A, Murry, 1938)
Directions: In this teat you are asked to compare your behavioral and
emotional reactions with those of most persons of your age - with the 
hypothetical average among college students*
Read each statestent carefully and make up your mind whether it is more or 
less true for you than it is for the average. Then, make a oheok in the 
proper column.
I enjoy organising or directing the ac­
tivities of a group, team, club, or 
coradlttee
I am driven to ever greater efforts by 
an unalacked ambition  .......
I am in my element when I am with a 
group of people who enjoy life , . , ,
X take pains not to hurt the feelings 
of others  ............ .
I can dehl with an aotual situation 
better than I oan oops with general 
ideas and theories
X argue with seat for my point of view 
against others •• ................
I feel that nothing else which life 
oan offer is a substitute for great 
achievement .  ............  .
X become very attaohed to ay friends ,
I will take a good deal of trouble to 
help a younger man - to get him a job, 
to intercede for M m  or in some other 
way to further his interests • • . . ,
Below Above
Average Average
-3 -1 +1 +2 +3
I have a rather good head for business
£ find it rather easy to lead a group of 
persona and maintain discipline . . .
I feel that ay future peace and. self- 
respect depend upon my accomplishing 
some notable pieee of work . . • . •
I give myself utterly to the happiness 
of someone X love
I go out of ay m y  to comfort people 
when they are in misery......... .
X UUce being in the thick of action .
I usually influence others more than 
they influence m e . . . , . . . . . .
X set difficult goals for myself which 
I attempt to reach . • • .........,
I feel 'out of sorts' if X have to be by 
myself for any length of time • • • .
X enjoy the company of younger people
I am Interested in everything that Is 
going on in the world: business, poli­
tics, social affairs, etc. • . • • •
X am usually the one to make the neoee 
saiy decisions when X am with another 
person . . . . . . . . . . . . . a .
X work with energy at the Job that lies 
before me instead of dreaming about the 
future  .................   •
I like to hang around with a group of 
congenial people and talk about any­
thing that comes tq>....... .
X give ay time and energy to those who 
ask for it ......... . . . . . . .
X am extremely interested In the ac­
tivities of other people . . . . . .
I feel that I oan dominate a aoolal 
situation • • • • • • • • • • « • • • •
When ngr own Interests are at stake, I 
become entirely oonoentrated upon my 
job and forget ny obligations to others
1 make as many friends as possible and 
am on the lookout for mare • • » • • •
People are apt to tell me their inner- 
nost secrets and troubles . . • • • • •
I like to do things with uy hands: manual 
labor, manipulation or construction * .
1 feel the sense of power that canes 
when 1 am able to control the action of 
others » • * • # • • • • • • • • • • •
I enjoy relaxation wholeheartedly only 
when it follows the successful com­
pletion of a substantial piece of work
X accept social invitations rather than 
stay at hose alone •
I am easily moved by the misfortunes of 
other people •
X am a practical person, interested in 
tangible achievement . « • • • • • • •
X assert myself with energy when the 
occasion demands it • • • • • • • • • •
I feel the spirit of competition in 
most of my activities • » • • • • • • •
if possible, I have my friends with me 
wherever I go • • • • » .  • • * « • • •
I am drawn to people who are sick, un­
fortunate or unhappy , , . .........
I like to have people about me most of 
the tins .......
I feel that I should like to be a leader 
and sway others to my opinion.......
1 work like a slave at everything 1 
undertake until I an satisfied with the 
result  ...............
I an desperately unhappy If I am sepa­
rated from the person I lore . • • * .
I an especially oonsiderate of people 
who are less fortunate than I .......
I would rather take an active part in 
contemporary events than read and think 
about then « • • , , • , • * * * • • *
I feel that I an driven by an underlying 
desire for power • • • ............
I enjoy work as much as play • • » • •
I sake a point of keeping in close touch 
with the doings and interests of my 
friends....................... .
1 feel great sympathy for an 'underdog* 
and I am apt to do what X oan for that 
person • . • « • • * • • • « • • , • •
Honey and social prestige are matters 
of importance t o m e * . , ...........
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TABUS X
DATA SET (258 Staples)''
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a b e O
16.8 6 .I1 1 1
11.1 5.0 1 I
10.5 6.U 8 1
12.6 6.U 1 1
10.2 7.2 8 8
10.5 U.O 1
11.u U.2 1 1
11.il ll.O 1 1
6.6 6.6 1 1
10.8 6.0 1 1
11.7 U.8 1 1
8*7 6.0 8 1
9.9 6.0 1 1
8.7 6.U S
6.6 6.U 1 1
8.7 5.0 1 1
9.3 U.6 1 1
8.1 6.6 8 8
8.7 3.2 1 8
9.0 6.8 1 1
9.3 U.6 1 1
9.3 U.6 1 1
8.7 7.2 1 1
10.8 8.0 1 1
7.2 6.6
7.2 6.6 1 1
9.9 5.8 1 1
9.0 U.8 1 I
9.9 U.8 1 1
£
m  figures are aeaae except *e' and 'o' Which are 
abbreviated aat 8 * Strike-Prone Behavior; 1 • Lockout-Prone Behavior*
TABLE X (c<mt.)
DATA SET (2$B Samples)
a Ik e o
11.7 U.6 1 X
10,5 U.8 8 1
10.5 3.6 1 X
7.5 5.6 8 8
8.U U.O 1 X
& 5 5.6
7.5 5.6 8 8
7.2 3.6 1
8.U 5.2 8 X
10.2 5.2 1
9.3 5.8 8 X
9.3 5.U 1 X
9.0 6.U 8
8.U 6.U
7.2 6.U 8
6.0 3.2 1 X
U.8 3.2 8 X
6.0 6.6 8 8
7.2 7.0 1 X
5.1 6.6
5.7 U.U 1 X
6.0 3.2 1 X
8.U 5.U 1 X
7.5 U.8 1 X
9.0 6.8 1 X
9.6 6.8 1 X
10.5 6 .0 1 8
10.5 8.0 8
9.6 8.0 1 X
5.U U.U 1 X
8.U 5.U 1 I
8.1 6.2 X
7.5 U.8 1 X
8.1 5.8 8 X
7.2 5.U a 8
7.2 5.8 8 X
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TABLE X (oont.)
DATA SET (258 Samples)
a
■
* e O
6*9 3.6 1 1
8.7 3.0 1 1
10.5
8.1
7.5
U.U
U.U
5.U
1 1
8.U 5.U 1 1
8.7 5.0 1 1
10.8 6.6 1 8
12.3 5.0 1 1
7.8 6.8 a 1
10.5 5.8 1 1
6.8 s 1
8 .1v 6.2 8 8
7.8 6.8 8
7.8 6.2 1
10.2 5.6 1 1
6.8 6 .0 8 1
10.2 7.2 1 1
9.0 6.U 8 1
7.8 6.2 8 8
5.7 5.8 8 8
5.7 6.2 8 8
9.0 6.2 1
6.9 7.U 8 1
8.7 6.8 i 1
7.5 7.8 8 8
6.9 7.8 8 8
5.7 7.0 8 8
6.9 7.8 1 8
5.7 7.8 8 a
6.0 5.2 1 8
8.U 6.2 1 1
U.2 7.0 8 8
7.5 6.2 1 1
6.3 6.2 8 ' 8
7.2 6.2 1 8
5.U U.6 8 8
5.1* 6.2 8 8
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TABLE X (coat,)
.DATA SET (2$8 Staples)
a b e 0
9.3 7.6 1 s
9.9 7.0 1 1
7.5 7.0 8 8
10,2 5.0 1 1
6.0 3.U a 1
U.8 U.2 a 8
U.8 5.0 a
12.3 6.U 1 1
9.9 8,2 a
9.6 U.U 1 1
8.7 6.6 a 1
U.6 5.8 a 1
5.1 6.2 a
U.8 6.2 a
13.8 6.U 1 1
11.7 6.U 8 8
10.8
10.8
6.6
6.2 1 1
9.6 5.6 8 1
7.5
9.6
7.6
6.8 1 1
9.6 5.6 1 1
10.2 U.U 1 1
8.1 6.2 1
7.8 5.8 1 1
9.6 5.6 1 1
6.3 6.0 8 1
11.U 5.U 1 1
8.1 U.U 1
8.1 5.U 8
9.6 8.6 1 8
9.3 7.6 1 1
6.3 8.0 8
9.3 7.U 1 1
7.2 9.2 8
7.5 9.2 1 1
7.5 8.0 1 1
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TABLE X (eonb.)
DATA SET (2J8 Saaplaa)
a b e 0
8.U 3.8 1 8
6.6 U.2 a 8
7.5 2.6 1 1
7.8 5.8 1
9.3 6.2 1 1
9.3 6.2 1 1
6.6 5.U 1 1
9.9 U.6 1 1
10.8 5.8 a 1
9.3 7.2 a
3.9 5.8 1
8.1 5.U 1 1
9.0 8.2 1 1
9.0 7.6 1 1
8.1 6.6 1 1
8.1 U.8 1 1
9.3 6.2 1 1
6.6 7.8 8 1
8.1 6.6 1 1
8.1 u.e 1 1
6.0 6.0 1
9.3 U.U 1 1
8.1 6.0 1
10.2
6.9
5.6
6.8
1 1
8.7 6.6 1 1
7.8 U.6 1 1
8.1 U.U 1 1
6.9 8.U 1
6.9 5.8 1 1
7.2 5.U 1 1
7.5
6.9
6.U
6.8
8 8
6.6 U.6 1 1
7.2 U.U 1 1
7.5 U.U 1 1
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TABLE X (oont.)
DATA SET (258 Samples)
a b e o
7.2 5.U 1 1
6*3 7.2 a a
7.8 6.0 1 1
6.9 5.U a 1
7.2 5.U 1 1
6.3 7.2 a a
10.8 U.6 1 1
10.5 6.2 a a
9.9 6.0 a 1
10.5 6.U 1 1
10.8 U.6 1 1
10.8 U.6 1 1
10.8 6.U 1 a
9.0 3.2 1 1
10.8 3.2 1 1
9.3 5.2 a a
11.1 U.8 1 1
10.5 U.U a a
8.1 U.6 a 8
8.1 U.8 a a
6.9 U.6 1 1
7.2 5.2 a a
7.5 5.6 a 8
6.9 U.6 1 1
7.2 6.2 a 1
6.9 6.2 a 8
6.9 6.2 a 8
9.0 6.8 1 1
8.7 5.8 1 1
9.0 6.8 a a
9.3 6.8 1 1
8.7 6.2 1 1
7.5 5.6 a a
7.2 U.8 1 1
7.5 U.8 1 1
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TABLE X (eont.)
DATA SET (258 Samples)
a b e o
6.3 7.0 s 1
11 .U 6.6 1 1
9.3 6.2 s 8
9.0 7.2 s S
9.3 6.6 1 1
9.3 6.2 1 1
10.2 6.2 1 1
11.U U.U 1 1
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APPENDIX F
ttlQE BARGAINING GAMS
The gene is played toy four employee representatives. They are gathered 
to discuss a pay package recommended toy an arbitration committee. This 
package has been individually rejected toy the employee representatives* 
but due to various pressures they have agreed to formally discuss the 
Issues* Progress on the package negotiations thus far is presented 
below:
Proposed Pay Rise 
Initial Initial Arbitrators1 Final
Mgt. employee reoommenda- employee
Position # offer demands tlons demands
Above rank of 
Supervisor
5 20* 1*0% 3055 35*
Supervisor 15 15* 1*0* 2055 30*
Skilled workers 150 10* UO* 15* 25*
Semi-skilled/
unskilled
21*0 6* Uo* 10* 20*
Additional information:
1* Positions of the rank of supervisor and above are not protected toy 
union contract*
2« The organisation is labor-intensive*
3* There is one representative for each of the four groups.
1*. The state of the economy is contemporary.
3* The Government may intervene if a compromise is not reached*
Buies of the game:
1* Representatives will debate whether to accept or reject the pay 
package recoraaended toy the arbitrators. At the end of a 20-mlnute 
session* the team will vote whether to continue to hold out. If the 
package passes unanimously* the game is over.
2* Each representative completes a questionnaire at the end of the 
session*
3. If the package is rejected* three additional 20-minute sessions may 
be called to order to end the deadlock. These other sessions ax's 
presumed to take place in 30-day intervals. During this period* the 
company is not functioning.
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U. New proposals are not permitted. The package must be considered 
in its entirety* A record of proceedings will be maintained for 
each session*
TABTJt iV
PAIOFF SCHEDULE FOR WAGE BARGAINING GAME
Session I 
Compromise 
No compromise
Above rank of
Supervisor
12
0
Supervisor
8
2
Skilled
3
5
Semi-skilled/
Unskilled
2
6
Session II 
Compromise 
No dompromise
6
h
10
2
5
5
h
6
Session X U  
Compromise 
No compromise
6
h
8
6
2
2
Session IV 
Compromise 
No compromise
U
0
3
0
h
0
1
0
Five additional points will be awarded for all participants for the in­
formation they provide during the game.
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